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Executive Summary
In 1997, when California adopted a five year ban on human
reproductive cloning, the legislation required the appointment of an
expert group to provide advice to the Governor and Legislature
about how to proceed when the five years had ended. This is the
report of that California Advisory Committee on Human Cloning. It
is not, in any sense, a report of the Governor, the Legislature, or the
State. Instead, it is our effort to provide useful advice to California,
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laying out the background on the issues, analyzing the arguments, and
presenting our recommendations. The Committee, made up of
twelve Californians from a wide range of backgrounds, has studied
these issues for over two years. In five public meetings around the
State, we have heard testimony from international experts and
comments from ordinary Californians. We heard many different
views and, indeed, our most fundamental conclusion may be that, on
many of these questions, reasonable people can and do disagree.
Nonetheless, the Committee has found itself in unanimous agreement
on five main recommendations:
1. The Committee unanimously agrees that California should ban
human reproductive cloning. Many arguments support this position,
some dealing with physical and psychological safety, some with
ethical or social concerns and some with regulatory and political
issues. We all believe, based on current knowledge on physical safety,
that California should prohibit human reproductive cloning.
Moreover, while not all members of the Committee were persuaded
by the same set of arguments, most Committee members have
concluded that some combination of the other arguments should also
lead to prohibition of human reproductive cloning even if it were
proven physically safe.
2. The Committee unanimously agrees that California should not
prohibit but should reasonably regulate human non-reproductive
cloning. We believe that use of this technology offers potential
medical and scientific benefits while not raising many of the same
concerns as human reproductive cloning. Such uses might include
cloning technology as a source of human stem cells that would not be
rejected by a patient's immune system. California should regulate all
human non-reproductive cloning in the State, public or private. That
regulation should do at least three things: a) prohibit the use of pre-
embryos after development of the primitive streak, b) ensure that the
persons providing cells for this purpose gave informed consent, and c)
require that research be permitted by an approved Institutional
Review Board ("IRB").'
3. In banning or regulating human cloning, California may be
affected by actions of the federal government. Federal regulation
needs to be watched carefully to ensure that California's actions are
both necessary and appropriate. The actions of other states, which
might provide experience useful to the California regulatory plan,
should also be watched. [2]
4. Regulating a scientific field undergoing rapid change is difficult
for a legislature. The California Legislature should define the terms
1. One Committee member, Francis Pizzulli, would go further in stipulating the
substance of IRB review. His views on this point are set out separately at page 1204.
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of its prohibition on human reproductive cloning carefully and its
regulation of human non-reproductive cloning carefully but broadly.
It should delegate the implementation, including further definition, of
that regulation to a state agency.
5. The Committee strongly believes that California will increasingly
face complex challenges arising from genetic and reproductive
technologies. "Cloning" by embryo-splitting is one of many such
technologies. We recommend that California establish an on-going
mechanism to advise the Governor and the Legislature on this and
related issues of human biotechnology.
We discuss the reasoning behind these recommendations, and
much more, in this report. [3]
Introduction
This report is the product of over two years of work and
meetings by the California Advisory Committee on Human Cloning.
The Committee, made up of 12 Californians from different
backgrounds and fields (Appendix No. 1), has listened to expert
testimony; studied the scientific, ethical, and legal literature; and
discussed at length the many issues raised by the possible application
to humans of the technique, known as nuclear transfer cloning, used
to produce Dolly, the world's most famous sheep.
Members of the Committee began their work with different
opinions on various aspects of human cloning. Some of those
differences have disappeared; others remain. In spite of our
continuing disagreements on some points, though, this group has
reached a consensus on several important recommendations. We
unanimously agreed that California should not ban non-reproductive
human cloning, that California should prohibit reproductive human
cloning, and that the State should create a more permanent body to
provide advice and expertise on other important ethical, legal, and
policy issues that will arise from our increased understanding of
human biology.
This report sets out our recommendations and the analysis
behind them. It does so, in part, by laying out arguments for and
against human cloning. No Committee member agrees with every
argument in the report; for most of the arguments, the Committee
concluded that reasonable people could reach varying conclusions.
Nonetheless, our eventual conclusions are strongly and unanimously
held.
The report is organized in four sections. The first section
provides background information about the Committee, human
cloning, and the legal and public reaction to its prospect. The second
section discusses non-reproductive human cloning. The third section
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analyzes the arguments concerning reproductive human cloning. The
final section describes some issues about the implementation of the
Committee's recommendations.
I. Background
This section of the Committee's report provides background
information. It begins with information about the Committee itself,
then continues with some basic information about the science of
human cloning. It then describes the legal status of human cloning, in
the United States and elsewhere. It ends with discussion of the public
opinion about human cloning.
A. The California Advisory Committee on Human Cloning
On February 23, 1997, the British newspaper The Observer
published a report of the successful production of a sheep named
Dolly from the nucleus of an adult cell injected into an enucleated
egg. The report set off an international debate about the ethical, legal
and social ramifications of a powerful new technology for cellular and
[4] embryological and related biomedical research, as well as for
genetic design of mammalian species, in particular, the human
species.
Like many other major scientific discoveries that resulted in
major changes in our worldview, cloning was immediately
controversial. The next day President Clinton requested a report
within 90 days from the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
(NBAC) and, without waiting for the report, issued an executive
order barring federal funding of cloning research on March 4, 1997.
The NBAC conducted a rapid review of published opinions and
reports, held public hearings, and published a report on June 9, 1997.2
The conclusions of the NBAC were that there were clearly such great
safety and efficacy concerns with cloning procedures that had until
then been reported that it would be immoral and contrary to good
public policy to attempt cloning in humans. They recommended
legislation to place a moratorium on attempts to clone humans. They
reached no conclusion with respect to the question as to whether, if
research improved safety and efficacy, the procedure itself was
intrinsically immoral, calling for a broad public dialogue to clarify this
issue.
Legislation has been introduced several times in Congress to ban
or restrict cloning. Congress has considered such legislation in the
2. U.S. National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Cloning Human Beings, Volume 1.
Report and Recommendations of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission,
Rockville, MD, June 1997.
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aftermath of public announcements of plans to clone humans, first in
1998 by Dr. Seed and then in 2001 by Drs. Zavos and Antinori and by
a company called "ClonAid," which is connected to a religious group
called the Raelians. As a result of the recent announcements, the
House Energy and Commerce subcommittee held a public hearing on
human cloning on March 29,2001. A second hearing on May 2,2001
was held by the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Science,
Technology and Space. Federal legislation banning reproductive
cloning has been introduced and one bill has passed the House of
Representatives, but, to date, Congress has not enacted any law on
the subject
There has also been activity at the state level, which led to
legislation banning human cloning in at least four states, including
California. In 1997, the California legislature passed two enactments
about human cloning: Senate Bill 1344 and Senate Concurrent
Resolution 39 (Appendix No.2). S.B. 1344, passed unanimously in
the Senate and 44 to 17 in the Assembly, defined cloning as "the
practice of creating or attempting to create a human being by
transferring the nucleus from a human cell from whatever source into
a human egg cell from which the nucleus has been removed for the
purpose of, or to implant, the resulting product to initiate a pregnancy
that could result in the birth of a human being."
The legislation established "a five year moratorium on cloning of
an entire human being." The State Director of Health Services was
"called upon to establish a panel of representatives from the fields of
medicine, religion, biotechnology, genetics, law, bioethics, and the
general public" to evaluate the "medical, ethical and social
implications," review public policy and "advise the Legislature and
the Governor in this area." Senate Concurrent Resolution 39
required the report to be submitted "not later than December 31,
2001." [5]
Implementation of the legislation was assigned to the Genetic
Disease Branch of the California Department of Health Services. On
December 23, 1998, the Director of the Department of Health
Services, S. Kimberly Belsh6, formally appointed a group of twelve
individuals with the expertise required by the legislation to be
members of the California Advisory Committee on Human Cloning.
No staff or funding was provided for the Committee's work;
Committee members were not paid for their work beyond
reimbursement of some travel expenses.
The Committee had its first orientation and organization meeting
on May 8, 1999. Over the next 18 months the Committee held five
3. Vogel G. Science Policy: Cloning Bills Proliferate in U.S. Congress. Science
292:1037, May 11, 2001.
1148 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53
CLONING CALIFORNIANS?
advertised public meetings at different locations throughout
California. The Committee's approach focused each meeting on a
specific area of interest and invited knowledgeable speakers to make
presentations on that topic, followed by questions from the
Committee. Each meeting included a period for public comment and
dialogue with the Committee and each public meeting was open to
the media. Agendas for all meetings are attached as Appendix No. 3.
All meetings were recorded and minutes were produced for each
meeting. A selection of articles from the press and scientific
publications and any correspondence received were included in the
Committee's material for each meeting.
The Committee's task was made more manageable by the fact
that a great many of the issues and most of the scientific and ethical
arguments had been addressed by the NBAC. The voluminous
literature about the issue in books and articles was also available for
Committee review. A partial reading list is attached as Appendix No.
4.
After the first round of public hearings was complete, the
Committee held a series of five closed meetings to develop the text of
a report, including recommendations. This is that report. It
represents the consensus of the twelve members of the Committee as
to their recommendations to the California government. Probably no
member of the Committee agrees with every statement in this report,
but it does embody, in general, our unanimous recommendations.
This report is not a position of the state government and it has not
been subject to advance approval by any state body.
Although the NBAC report called for broad public dialogue on
the issue, no agency of the federal government undertook the
organization or funding of such educational and consensus building
effort. None of the other states which passed cloning legislation
engaged in any process of public participation in developing the
issues, technical, legal and moral, raised by the technology.
Although a large majority of the public continues to oppose
human cloning, neither legislatures nor scholars have reached a
consensus on the appropriate action. Most of the scientific
community continues to echo the findings of the NBAC that
reproductive cloning remains a risky and inefficient technology, not
ready to be attempted in humans. While the prospect of premature
application of current technology has been widely condemned,
differing opinions exist on whether human reproductive cloning, if
physically safe for the cloned embryo, fetus, and child, should be
banned.[6]
The California Committee agrees with the NBAC that there is a
need to "provide information and education to the public" and has
adopted this concept in the preparation of this report. In the 4 1/2
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years since Dolly's birth was announced, there have been
innumerable articles about human cloning, but few attempts to work
through, in an even-handed way, the arguments on both sides We
believe, whatever the merits of our report, the State of California
should be congratulated for making an effort to advance public
understanding and discussion of the issues surrounding human
cloning. We hope our report will advance that discussions, among
policymakers and among the public.
B. Scientific Background
In 1997, the report of the production of a newborn lamb by a
process that involved the transfer of a nucleus from an adult cell of a
donor sheep to a recipient enucleated egg sparked the interest of the
world. "Dolly" became an instant celebrity and a public dialogue was
rapidly initiated to explore the possibilities of human reproductive
cloning and to consider the ethical, legal, and social issues that might
be raised should such technology be developed and put to use. While
the achievements of Ian Wilmut, Keith Campbell, and their
colleagues at the Roslin Institute in Scotland are notable from both a
practical and a fundamental scientific standpoint, as with virtually
everything else in science, this work rested on the prior contributions
of many others.
(1) Cloning Before Dolly
Since the beginning of the 20 century, scientists had speculated
on the nature of the early events in embryonic growth that result in
the differentiation of the various cells' tissues and organs that
constitute a mature animal. The cell's nucleus was known to be the
repository of the genetic program that guided development, but the
nature of the changes that took place in the nucleus during
differentiation was (and to a considerable extent still is) unknown.
The German embryologist August Weismann first theorized that the
nucleus of the single cell zygote, i.e., a fertilized egg, must be
totipotent, that is, it contains all of the information required to direct
the development of a complete animal.4 He also incorrectly believed
that with subsequent cellular and nuclear division, there was a
progressive loss of genetic information that resulted in the restriction
of developmental potential of the daughter cells. He attempted to
demonstrate this experimentally, but inevitably encountered many
technical difficulties in an attempt to prove what we now know to be
an incorrect hypothesis.
4. Kirkwood TB and Cremer T. Cytogerontology Since 1881: August Weismann and
a Review of Modern Progress. Hum Genet 60(2):101-21,1982.
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In 1892, Hans Driesch, using sea urchin eggs and embryos, was
able to separate the daughter cells resulting from early embryonic cell
division and showed that each cell from two and four celled embryos
could continue to divide independently and to give rise to a complete
and intact sea urchin This was probably the earliest example of
reproductive cloning by the process of embryo splitting. In the 1920's
and 1930's Hans Spemann carried out some technically extraordinary
experiments that demonstrated that totipotency, i.e., the ability to
develop into all the cells needed to make an adult, could be retained
by embryonic nuclei through a number of cell divisions. Using a
"noose" [7] constructed from a human hair, he was able to partition
part of the cytoplasm of early developing salamander embryos. Then
he was able to coax nuclei that were produced via cell division
(mitosis) in another part of the embryo to move into the isolated bud
of embryo cytoplasm. Here the "transplanted" nucleus, though in the
same embryo, would initiate the development of a second distinct
embryo. This work suggested that at the eight or even sixteen cell
stage, nuclei still retained the ability to specify the development of a
complete new individual. In subsequent experiments, for which he
was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1935, Spemann showed that there
were changes that determined the fate of cells later in development.
Thus transplanted cells and tissues derived from embryos further
along in development retained their differentiated characteristics
even when moved to a new location within the embryo. Clearly there
were restrictive changes, i.e., loss of totipotency that occurred to the
nuclear genetic program as development progressed, but whether
these changes could be reversed was still not known.
By the early 1950's techniques had been developed which
enabled individual cell nuclei from amphibians to be removed from
their surrounding tissues and to be injected into eggs whose own
nucleus had been removed or destroyed. With these methods, called
"nuclear transfer," new questions could be asked regarding the
restrictive changes in the programming of nuclei with development.
Briggs and King demonstrated in 1951 that nuclei removed from early
frog embryos called blastocysts, which contained several thousand
cells, could be introduced into enucleated eggs and direct
development at least until the tadpole stage. John Gurdon then
carried out some key experiments in which intestinal cell nuclei
derived from tadpoles were transferred to enucleated eggs in a similar
fashion and gave rise (albeit with low efficiency) to mature adult
5. Oppenheimer JM. Hans Driesch and the Theory and Practice of Embryonic
Transplantation. Bull Hist Med 44(4):378-82, Jul-Aug 1970.
6. Fassler PE. Hans Spemann (1869-1941) and the Freiburg School of Embryology.
Int J Dev Biol; 40(1):49-47, Feb. 1996.
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frogs. This research demonstrated that even the well-differentiated
cell nuclei of tadpoles could be reprogrammed to direct full
embryonic development. In subsequent experiments, Gurdon used
nuclei from adult frog skin cells and showed that these could direct
differentiation up to the tadpole stage (although apparently not
beyond this point). All of this work suggested that much of
differentiation and development was not associated with any
irreversible changes in the nucleus.
Success in cloning and nuclear transplantation in mammals
required overcoming many new technical hurdles as compared to
work with sea urchins or amphibians. Mammalian eggs are much
smaller, more fragile, and, unlike the eggs of frogs and sea urchins,
which are released by the mother, mammalian eggs need to complete
their development internally. By 1979, Willadsen had achieved the
artificial production of identical twin sheep by splitting very early
embryos. Although this could be considered a form of cloning, it
merely reproduced artificially the natural process that causes identical
twins; it did not create a genetic duplicate of a sheep that had already
lived.
Throughout the 1980's conflicting results were reported
regarding the possibility of achieving embryonic development
following nuclear transfer in mice. In retrospect, these results were
difficult to interpret because of incomplete scientific understanding
and imperfect technique. Subsequent work seems to indicate that, at
least in mammals, eggs that are in the process of the second meiotic
division are more competent recipients for nuclear transfer studies
than are zygotes due to the presence of high levels of a molecule [8]
known as maturation promoting factor (MPF). Furthermore,
reprogramming of the donor nucleus is markedly facilitated by
causing it to stop its progression through the cycle of events required
for cell division (the cell division cycle or mitosis) prior to transfer to
the enucleated egg. In 1986, Willadsen made use of this new
information to produce the first mammals utilizing nuclear transfer
technology from eight or sixteen cell embryos into enucleated sheep
eggs.' He was able to obtain live born lambs from these experiments
that in some instances were genetically identical to one another; that
is, they were clones. Shortly thereafter, First and colleagues obtained
similar results in cattle in efforts to accelerate genetic improvements
in dairy herds. Thus, nuclear transfer technology had been used to
create cloned mammals a decade before Dolly, but these clones were
7. Willadsen SM. A Method for Culture of Micromanipulated Sheep Embryos a[n]d
its use to Produce Monozygotic Twins. Nature 22;277(5694):298-300, Jan. 1979.
8. Willadsen SM. Nuclear Transplantation in Sheep Embryos. Nature 320(6057):63-
5, 1986 Mar 6-12.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53
all created using cells taken from early stage embryos, not from adult
animals. Based on the work with amphibians, DNA from adult cells
was not thought capable of directing the new development of a
complete animal.
(2) Dolly
In the early 1990's Drs. Keith Campbell and Ian Wilmut worked
together in Scotland to investigate systematically the requirements for
successful nuclear transfer by manipulating both donor cells and
recipient eggs. This work culminated in the discovery that cultured
embryonic epithelial cells could act as nuclear donors if the cells were
first induced to leave the active cell division cycle and enter the so-
called quiescent (G.) state. Five live born lambs resulted from the
early efforts.9 Two of the lambs died within minutes of birth and the
third succumbed after ten days. However, two other animals that
came to be known as Megan and Morag lived well into adulthood.
This work was highly significant because it demonstrated for the first
time that mammals could be cloned from nuclei derived from well-
differentiated cells that had been maintained in tissue culture. Yet,
these were still cells that had originally been derived from fetal sheep.
Subsequently, Campbell and Wilmut extended their efforts to
the use of cultured cells from an adult donor, and this work produced
Dolly."0 Dolly was part of a wide-ranging experiment that involved
the transfer of donor cell nuclei into nearly one thousand enucleated
sheep eggs. Roughly a third of the eggs received nuclei from
embryonic cells, a third from fetal cells, and a third from a cell line
created with cells from the mammary tissue of a six year old ewe.
Although the adult cells were used to create numerous embryos that
were implanted into ewes, Dolly was the only successful pregnancy.
Her distinction is not that she is the first cloned mammal - sheep and
cattle had been produced through nuclear transfer cloning since the
mid-1980s. Dolly, however, was the first mammal successfully cloned
from an adult cell, thus opening, for the first time, a plausible
scientific prospect for cloning living humans.
(3) Reproductive Cloning Since Dolly
In the 4 1/2 years since the announcement of Dolly's birth,
researchers have used nuclear transfer cloning with adult donor cells
to produce cattle, goats, pigs, mice, and one gaur (an endangered wild
ox native to South Asia). At the same time, research in other species
9. Campbell KH, McWhir J, Ritchie WA, Wilmut I. Sheep Cloned by Nuclear
Transfer From a Cultured Cell Line. Nature 380(6569):64-6,1996 Mar 7.
10. Wilmut I, Schnieke AE, McWhir J, Kind AJ, Campbell KH. Viable Offspring
Derived From Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells. Nature 385(6619):810-3, 1997 Feb 27.
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has not been successful. Well-financed efforts to clone house pets -
dogs [9] and cats - have thus far been unsuccessful. No primates of
any kind have been successfully cloned from adult cells; only two
primates (two monkeys) have been successfully cloned by nuclear
transfer from embryonic cells. As far as we know, no human clones
have been born, or have even been implanted for possible birth. It is
not known at this point whether human cloning by nuclear transfer is
even possible, although each new mammalian species cloned makes
human cloning seem more plausible.
Even if human cloning by nuclear transfer is possible, several
scientific issues regarding this kind of cloning need to be emphasized.
These affect the relationship between the clone and the source of the
donated cell nucleus, as well as the likely safety of such a procedure.
Technically, "clones" produced by these methods are not
completely genetically identical to the individual that donated the
nucleus. The donor cell has DNA in both the nucleus and in its
mitochondria, which are cellular energy producing organelles -
structures in the cytoplasm of cells separate from the nucleus. When
a nucleus is transferred to an enucleated egg, the donor mitochondria
are either left behind entirely or grossly outnumbered by the
mitochondria in the recipient egg. As a result, the new embryo
derives its mitochondria from the recipient egg. While this is
theoretically significant, the size of the nuclear genome is
approximately 200,000 times larger than the mitochondria genome,
and as far as is known, the mitochondria genes only encode proteins
that relate to energy production. Nevertheless, mutations in the
mitochondrial genes can produce serious disorders in humans.
Another unresolved scientific issue relates to internal changes,
called epigenetic changes, in the nucleus of somatic cells. It is now
fairly clear that the DNA in most differentiated somatic cells is not
fundamentally different from the DNA in the single celled zygote. It
has the same sequence of adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine
that make up the organism's genetic code. But a series of chemical
changes to the primary structure of DNA, such as the addition of
methyl groups to DNA, regularly occurs during development.
Another example of such epigenetic changes is genomic imprinting.
In mammals, the paternally inherited copy of the genome and the
maternally inherited copy of the genome are not functionally
equivalent. A heritable "imprint" is created during gametogenesis
(the formation of sperm and eggs) so that subsequently certain genes
are expressed by only one of these contributions, i.e., only from
maternal or only from paternal genome. To be successful in directing
development, an adult nucleus would have to have maintained a
stable imprinting pattern and this pattern would need to be preserved
or replaced following nuclear transfer. The success of producing live-
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born animals by this procedure suggests that such issues are not
insurmountable, but there may be imprinting errors that contribute to
the high failure rate seen in cloning experiments to date.
Another issue relates to the possibility that genetic damage
(mutations) may have accumulated in the differentiated adult somatic
cell selected to be the donor nucleus. The longer cells are maintained
in culture and the more divisions that they undergo either in vitro or
in the body, the greater is the possibility that an error in DNA
replication might [10] occur or that some other form of DNA damage
might accrue. Any one cell uses only a small fraction of the 30,000 or
more genes encoded in a person's DNA. A skin cell uses the genes it
needs to function as a skin cell; a liver cell uses some of the same
genes and some different genes. A skin cell could function perfectly
well as a skin cell in spite of a crucial mutation in a gene vital to, for
example, liver function. A cloned fetus produced from such a cell
might not be able to produce a functioning liver and therefore would
die. Such mutations might render certain somatic cells incapable of
directing full and normal development.
Questions of telomere shortening and cellular senescence are
also important and unresolved." Telomeres are the ends of
chromosomes that shorten each time a cell divides and that therefore
represent a log of the functional age of a somatic cell. There is a
lower limit to the size of telomeres that is compatible with cell life,
and therefore adult cells that have undergone many rounds of
replication during the life of an animal have fewer additional divisions
still available to them - they are "aged cells." Germ cells and cancer
cells seem to evade this problem of cellular aging because they
possess an active telomerase enzyme, which repairs and re-elongates
the chromosome ends. In the case of the use of an adult, presumably
"aged" somatic cell for nuclear transfer and cloning, it is not certain
at present what effect such telomere shortening of the chromosome in
the donor nuclei might have on the longevity of the resulting animal
following nuclear transfer. Conflicting evidence has been presented
with respect to the length of the telomeres in Dolly's cells and it is not
yet established whether or not Dolly is aging at a rate different from
other sheep her birth-defined age. Yanagamachi's group has serially
cloned mice for up to six generations by using somatic cell nuclei from
cloned mice as the donors in subsequent rounds of embryo transfer
experiments.'2 This might suggest that telomere shortening will not
11. Shiels PG, Kind AJ, Campbell KH, Waddington D, Wilmut I, Colman A, Schnieke
AE. Analysis of Telomere Lengths in Cloned Sheep. Nature;399(6734):316-7, 1999 May
27.
12. Wakayama T, Shinkai Y, Tamashsiro KL, NiidaH, Blanchard DC, Blanchard RJ,
Ogura A, Tanemura K, Tachibana M, Perry AC, Colgan DF, Mombaerts P, Yanagimachi
R. Cloning of Mice to Six Generations. Nature 407(6802):318-9, 200 Sep 21.
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be a problem, but the normal lifespan of a mouse is only two years,
and the scientists did encounter progressive difficulty in creating
clones with each succeeding generation.
A final scientific issue, very poorly understood at present, has to
do with precisely what is occurring during the so-call reprogramming
process when the somatic cell nucleus is first placed inside an egg's
cytoplasm. Normal reprogramming occurs within sperm and egg and
takes place over a piolonged period of time. Because cell division is
usually triggered shortly after nuclear transfer, in such systems there
is a very short period of time in which reprogramming may occur.
This may result in incomplete reprogramming in some instances.
Work carried out to date in the various animals that have been
the subjects of reproductive cloning experiments suggests that there
are important species differences in procedures and outcomes among
them. This will be vital to keep in mind before any human cloning
attempts might be made. Furthermore, the efficiency of obtaining
healthy live born clones is very low (on the order of 1% of attempts
implanted) in essentially every species that has been studied to date.
Many of the embryos die early in development and others progress to
later stages of gestation, but often demonstrate severe defects
incompatible with further normal development and life. A significant
number of nuclear transfer cloned animals have died in early infancy
of either respiratory problems [11] or overwhelming infections. And,
in some species, such as cattle, the newborns that result from such
pregnancies are larger than normal, giving rise to the so-called large
calf syndrome.13 Finally, and quite disturbingly, more recent work
suggests that some animals that appear normal at birth may have
significant health issues later in life including the sudden onset of
obesity without apparent increase in caloric intake, although other
work on cloned cattle indicates that those who appear normal at birth
remain normal as they age.
(4) Non-Reproductive or Therapeutic Cloning
In addition to the reproductive potential for human cloning, a
number of other applications have been described under the general
headings of "non-reproductive" or "therapeutic" cloning. These
methods would not be intended to produce living, fully developed
human beings, but rather to provide a source of what have come to be
called embryonic "stem cells" for the cellular treatment of human
diseases that otherwise cannot be treated effectively by established
drug- or cell-based methods. These embryonic "stem" cells are found
only in the early human and other mammalian embryos or in
13. Young LE, Sinclair KD, Wilmut I. Large Offspring Syndrome in Cattle and Sheep.
Rev Reprod;3(3):155-63,1998 Sept.
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particular locations in the early fetus. They are called "stem cells"
because they have a potential to develop into any and all types of
cells that are found in a fully developed human or other mammalian
organism. Embryonic stem cells from mice were isolated more than a
decade ago; human embryonic stem cells were only isolated in 1998.14
A full discussion of the science of stem cells is beyond the scope of
this report. A brief summary follows; one clear and useful reference
is a primer on stem cells issued by the Office of the Director of NIH
in May 2000.
As a result of extensive studies in other mammals, especially the
mouse, researchers believe that only these embryonic stem cells are
"pluripotent;" that is, they have been shown to be able to
differentiate into all cell types in the adult animal. In the mouse
system, such cells can, entirely on their own, develop into all cell
types found in a fully developed and normal mouse after they are
placed into the properly supportive location in a mouse embryo.
Since by most current methods they require such support, they are
usually termed "pluripotent" rather than "totipotent." Totipotent
would indicate that they can, without help, develop into a fully
mature mouse. While some experiments have suggested that these
cells may, in fact, turn out to be totipotent, most researchers still
consider that as unproven and therefore prefer the term
"pluripotent" to describe the embryonic stem cells.
These embryonic stem cells have exciting therapeutic potential
because, when they are exposed in the laboratory to one or another
of the many known kinds of "growth factors," they convert to more
adult-like fully differentiated cells such as muscle cells, neurons,
glandular cells and others. In the case of the mouse, when these
manipulated stem cells are introduced into tissues in a fully developed
mouse, they can become part of the tissue into which they have been
introduced and take part in the normal structure and function of that
tissue. It has therefore become possible to envision the use of "stem
cells" to treat serious human disorders such as Parkinson's disease,
muscular dystrophy, cancer, many forms of genetic disease and many
other disorders. For example, "stem [12] cells" derived from human
embryos might be introduced into the brain of patients with
Parkinson's disease to provide normal neurological functions that are
damaged in the disease as the nerve cells degenerate. Similar use can
be imagined to restore normal liver cells to patients with life-
14. Thomson, J. et. al. Embryonic Stem Cells Lines Derived from Human Blastocysts,
Science, 282:1145-1147, Nov 6,1998; Shamblott, M. et. al. Derivation of Plu[r]ipotent Stem
Cells from Cultured Human Primordial Germ Cells. PNAS, 95:13726-13731, Nov. 1998.
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threatening liver damage, cardiac muscle cells to patients with heart
damage, muscle cells to patients with muscular dystrophy, and so on.5
Embryonic stem cells could be used without any human cloning
in the sense used in this report. Nuclear transfer cloning may be
attractive for stem cell use, however, because of its implications for a
patient's immune system. If a patient received embryonic stem cells
that had been grown into heart muscle cells, his immune system might
recognize those cells as invaders and attack them. As a result, the
attempted treatment might fail or might require expensive and
dangerous suppression of the patient's immune system. It is plausible
that the nucleus from one of the patient's own cels could provide the
DNA for the stem cells. This might be done in one of two ways.
First, doctors might create an embryonic clone of the patient,
transferring the nucleus of one of his cells into an enucleated eggs.
That pre-embryo would then be destroyed in order to harvest stem
cells from it. Alternatively, it might be possible to insert DNA from
the patient into an already isolated embryonic stem cell. In either
case, if effective the procedure would produce heart muscle cells with
the patient's DNA. The patient's immune system would presumably
consider these cells part of itself, and thus not attack them.
Research has identified other kinds of "stem cells" from the
adult tissues in mammals. 6 These cells have been called "adult stem
cells" and have been identified in organs such as the bone marrow,
the brain, liver, muscle and other tissues. These special cells are rare
in each of these organs and their isolation is a difficult task. Some
recent evidence indicates that some of these adult stem cells can, in
some circumstances, be converted to other cell types when exposed to
growth factors or when transplanted into new body environments.
For instance, some researchers have found that the best known of
these adult stem cell, those found in the bone marrow, can become
muscle cells when introduced into adult muscle.
The recently discovered multipotent "stem"-like cells from many
kinds of adult tissue can theoretically be used in the same way as
embryonic stem cells. Human embryonic or fetal tissue may
therefore not be required to isolate functional and therapeutic "stem
cells" for the treatment of many human diseases. If adult stem cells
from the patient can be used, the immune system problems should
not arise. If the adult stem cells used come from another person,
cloning by nuclear transfer might still be used to produce adult stem
15. Parens, E Embryonic Stem Cells and the Bigger Reprogenetic Picture. Women's
Health Issues 10:119,2000.
16. Orlic D et al. Bone Marrow Cells Regenerate Infracted Myocardium. Nature
410:701-705, 2001; Kocher AA et al. Neovascularization of Ischemic Myocardium by
Human Bone Marrow-Derived Angioblasts Prevents Cardiomyocyte Apoptosis, Reduces
Remodeling and Improves Cardiac Function. Nature Biotech 7:430-436,2001.
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cells with the patient's DNA. At this stage, adult stem cells appear to
be more difficult to maintain in culture and their ability to change
may not be as unlimited as embryonic stem cells. Research in this
area is still limited and much remains to be learned.
C. Legal Background
[13] The legal status of human cloning is complex and unclear. 7
Although many nations have banned human cloning, variously
defined, it has not been banned by the federal government or by most
states.
(1) Regulation of Cloning by the Federal Government
Federal legislation on human cloning could have serious
implications for regulation by California, possibly making it
unnecessary or ineffective. Many bills have been introduced in
Congress to regulate human cloning but, as of the date of this report,
none has been enacted. These bills have had widely differing
provisions and would have very different implications for cloning
regulation by California.
The federal government has taken some action without new
legislation. President Clinton issued an order barring any federal
funding for research on human cloning. More significantly, in
January 1998, in response to Congressional and public concern over
the statement by Dr. Richard Seed that he would soon clone himself,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced that it had
regulatory jurisdiction over human cloning under existing federal
statutes.8 This jurisdiction, it said, was the same as its jurisdiction
over the use of "more than minimally manipulated" cells for
treatment purposes, which includes such fields as gene therapy. The
FDA stated that anyone seeking to do human cloning would need to
get permission from the FDA for such experiments; it implied that,
on the present state of knowledge, such permission would not be
forthcoming.
It is not at all clear that the FDA does have jurisdiction over
human reproductive cloning under existing statutes.19 It has never
asserted jurisdiction over similar assisted reproduction procedures
even when they also involved "more than minimally manipulated"
17. U.S. National Bioethics Advisory Commission. Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell
Research, Rockville, Md. Jan. 2000.
18. Food, Drug, Cosmetics Reports, "The Pink Sheet," 60, No. 3, Jan. 19, 1998 at T&G
1.
19. Weiss R. Human Clone Research Will Be Regulated, FDA Asserts It Has
Statutory Authority to Regulate Attempts at Human Cloning, Washington Post, Jan. 20,
1998.
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human cells, such as zygotes that had been fertilized in vitro or
through intracellular sperm injection. At least two published law
review articles have concluded that it does not have jurisdiction over
at least human reproductive cloning.'0 For the FDA to have such
jurisdiction, the cloned embryo would have to be, for purposes of the
statutory definitions, a "product" that was being used for treatment of
a disease or condition. Both conditions are questionable; the second
is particularly problematic when reproductive cloning is not being
used to overcome infertility but by a fertile couple or person for the
purpose of having a child with a particular genotype. Ultimately,
whether the FDA has jurisdiction would be a question for the courts;
at this point, we know of no lawsuit challenging its authority.
Although the FDA's power over human reproductive cloning is
uncertain, it does clearly have power over non-reproductive cloning
when used as a treatment for human diseases or conditions. The use
of cloned cells or tissues in such treatments would have to be
approved by the FDA; experimentation with such cells or tissues in
humans would also be governed by the agency.
Because it would probably require the creation of pre-embryos
via cloning technology, non-reproductive cloning is affected by
national rules on embryo research. This issue has been extremely
controversial at the federal level with regard to federal [14] funding
for such research. A 1994 National Institutes of Health Human
Embryo Research Panel would have allowed the use of human
embryos for federally funded research, including, with specific
limitations, the production of embryos for this purpose.21 The report
was not adopted as policy by NIH. Congress, however, in 1996
banned "the creation of a human embryo and embryos for research
purposes." The National Bioethics Advisory Commission issued its
report, "Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell Research," in January
2000. This was followed by release in August 2000 by NIH of its
Guidelines for Research Involving Human Pluripotent Stem Cells.
The guidelines allowed NIH funded investigators to conduct research
on embryonic stem cells obtained from private services, provided the
source is excess embryos produced to treat infertility that are donated
without compensation. Federal funding for the creation of stem cells
from abortions, their derivation from embryos, and the production of
embryos to serve as sources of stem cells, either by sexual
combination or by nuclear transfer for research, was prohibited.
20. Price EC. Does the FDA Have Authority to Regulate Human Cloning? Harvard J
Law & Technology 11:619-641, 1998; Rokosz GJ. Human Cloning: Is the Reach of FDA
Authority Too Far a Stretch? Seton Hall L. Rev. 30:464-515,2000; Weiss R. Legal Barriers
to Human Cloning May Not Hold Up. Washington Post; Wednesday May 23,2001, p A01.
21. National Institutes of Health. Report of the Human Embryo Research Panel.
Rockville, Md. Sept. 27, 1994.
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These guidelines were in turn limited by President Bush's August
9, 2001 decision to allow federal funding for embryonic stem cell
research only for cell lines established before the date of his
announcement. This would prohibit federal funding for research with
embryonic stem cells produced through cloning as no such cell lines
existed on August 9, 2001.
It is important to note that these rules apply only to research that
involves federal funds - privately funded research on non-
reproductive cloning is not affected by these policies although it
would, at some point, be regulated by the FDA. This limitation was
highlighted by the work by Advanced Cell Technologies in using
nuclear transfer technology and human eggs to produce what it called
early embryos (although none grew to be larger than six cells in size.)
(2) Regulation of Cloning by the States
In the first year after the announcement of Dolly's birth, more
than half the state legislatures considered bills that would have
banned human cloning. Only five states have, thus far, passed
statutes prohibiting human cloning: California in 1997", Michigan,
and Rhode Island in 199824, Louisiana in 1999", and, most recently,
Virginia 6 in 2001. The California statute, the first one adopted, bans
reproductive cloning for a period of five years. It does not deal with
non-reproductive cloning, but is restricted to situations where a
cloned embryo is implanted in a woman's uterus. The Rhode Island
and Louisiana statutes were modeled generally on California's. The
Michigan statute is much different. It bans reproductive and non-
reproductive cloning and contains no sunset date. Virginia's statute is
similarly broad, banning completely the transfer of any human cell
nucleus into oocytes. Several other states have passed legislation
barring state funding for human cloning research or prohibiting such
research at state institutions. It is not clear why more states have not
acted. After an initial flurry of introduced bills, four states passed
statutes by 1999 and only one since then. The FDA's assertion of
jurisdiction in early 1998, along with the clearly early stage of the
technology, may have made state action seem less important.[15]
More than 20 states have laws banning or restricting research
with human embryos. These laws were typically passed many years
22. Cal. Stats. 1997, Chap. 688, codified at Cal. Health and Safety Code, note
preceding §24185, §24185, §24187, §24189; Cal. Bus. And Prof. Code §2260.5, §16004,
§6105.
23. Mich. Stats. Ann., Title 14, Art. 15, §16274, §16275, §20197, §§26401 through
26406, Title 28, Art. 685a, §430a.
24. R.Is. Gen. Laws §§23-16.4-1 through 23-16.4-4.
25. La. Rev'd Stats., Title 40, §§1299.36 through 1299.36.6 and Title 37, §1285(A)(31).
26. Va. Code Ann. §§32.1-162.21, 32.1-162.22 (2001)
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ago in response to concerns expressed largely by "pro-life" groups.
These statutes could prohibit certain forms of non-reproductive
cloning. They could also be construed to prohibit reproductive
cloning at least at its early, experimental, and "research" stages. In
an effort to avoid regulating in vitro fertilization and other forms of
assisted reproduction, however, many of these statutes expressly state
that they do not govern research that seeks to result in the birth of a
living child.27
(3) Regulation of Cloning Outside the United States
Since the announcement of Dolly's birth, many countries have
banned human cloning, and several international bodies-including
the United Nations, the United Nations Educational, Social and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Council of Europe, the
European Parliament, the G7 (the group of leading economic
powers), and the World Health Assembly-have taken strong stands
against the cloning of human beings.
In 1997 UNESCO adopted a Declaration on the Human
Genome and Human Rights signed by 186 nations. Article 11 of the
Declaration prohibits "practices which are contrary to human dignity,
such as reproductive cloning of human beings." The Declaration is
not binding and, in any event, the United States is not a member of
UNESCO.
The most authoritative multilateral initiative banning human
cloning is that of the Council of Europe, an organization made up of
European governments but not part of the European Union. In 1998,
it approved a protocol to its Convention on Human Rights and
Dignity with Regard to Biomedicine. The protocol prohibits "any
intervention seeking to create a human being genetically identical to
another human being, whether living or dead." It was opened for
signatures on 12 January 1998 in Paris. As of April 2001 it has been
signed by 29 of the Council's 41 member states and has been ratified
by six of these (Greece, Slovakia, Slovenia, Georgia, Spain, and most
recently, Romania). Ratifying the Protocol commits the nation
involved to implement it, but the Protocol is not self-enforcing;
national legislation must be passed to make it effective. In a political
compromise, the Protocol leaves up to member countries the
definition of a human being. This is significant in that different
nations might or might not define human beings in ways that include
techniques for non-reproductive cloning.
Other countries that have passed national legislation restricting
human reproductive cloning include Australia, Austria, Argentina,
27. Greely HT. Human Cloning: A Study of the Difficulties of Defining Science. So
Calif Interdisp Law J 8:131-152, 1998.
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Belgium, Brazil, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Germany, India,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal,
Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, and
the United Kingdom. All together, as of April 2001, 38 of the world's
nearly 200 countries have banned human reproductive cloning.[16]
We have not attempted to survey definitively laws and policies
outside the United States on non-reproductive human cloning, but we
have looked at some countries.
A Canadian Discussion Group on Embryo Research endorsed
research on human embryos prior to 14 days after conception. They
recommended a ban on "fertilization of human ova for research and
research into human cloning chimeras, production of interspecies
embryos and transgenic embryos." However, they also recommended
a National Regulatory Body, which, subject to specific limitations,
would be empowered to permit and regulate broad use of embryos in
research.
In contrast the Human Genetics Advisory Committee and the
Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority in the United
Kingdom, while limiting research to embryos less than 14 days, would
permit the direct production of embryos for research by nuclear
transfer when done in licensed facilities.
The Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), Germany's main
research funding agency, issued guidelines that would allow research
on imported human embryonic stem cells. The DFG also endorsed
legislation, if needed, to allow use of surplus embryos produced in
Germany to be used and to form a commission to study the ethics of
public and private research involving embryos. This issue has been
extremely controversial in Germany and remains, at this time,
unresolved.
D. Public Opinion
Over the last four years polling in the United States has
consistently shown that a large majority of Americans oppose
reproductive human cloning. A poll taken by Time/CNN in February
2001 revealed that 90% of respondents think it is a bad idea to clone
human beings. An April 2001 poll by the American Museum of
Natural History concluded that 92% of Americans would not approve
of cloning to reproduce a favorite person. These results are
remarkably similar to polls taken four years earlier, shortly after the
announcement of Dolly. For example, a February 1997 Time/CNN
poll found that 93% of Americans opposed the cloning of humans.
All polling results depend on the exact wording and approach of the
poll, but it seems indisputable that human reproductive cloning is not
popular in the United States. On the other hand, approximately two
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thirds of Americans support embryonic stem cell research, although
there is no agreement on the source of the embryos.
In general, public opinion toward animal cloning is more positive
than toward human cloning. However, the majority of Americans
still oppose even animal cloning. For example, the 2001 Time/CNN
poll showed that 67% believed it was a bad idea to clone animals such
as sheep, and the 1997 Time/CNN poll showed that 66% opposed the
cloning of animals.[17]
H. California Should Prohibit Human Reproductive Cloning
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee unanimously agrees that California should ban
human reproductive cloning. Many arguments support this position,
some dealing with physical and psychological safety, some with
ethical or social concerns and some with regulatory and political
issues. We all believe, based on current knowledge on physical safety,
that California should prohibit human reproductive cloning.
Moreover, while not all members of the Committee were persuaded
by the same set of arguments, most Committee members have
concluded that some combination of the other arguments should also
lead to prohibition of human reproductive cloning even if it were
proven physically safe.
The Committee unanimously believes that human reproductive
cloning should be prohibited. Every Committee member agrees that
grave questions about the physical safety of the cloning process for
any resulting children require a prohibition unless and until the
method is proven safe. Most Committee members have concluded
that some combination of the other arguments should also lead to
prohibition of human reproductive cloning even if it were proven
physically safe. The Committee has reached these conclusions after
reviewing arguments in favor of human reproductive cloning as well
as arguments against it. This section of our report discusses those
arguments, looking first at the arguments for cloning and then at the
arguments against cloning. Each argument is summarized with its
counter-arguments. In almost all cases, this section of the report tries
to lay out the different positions without choosing among them.
A. Arguments Favoring Human Reproductive Cloning
The arguments made in favor of human reproductive cloning fall
into two categories: an argument for reproductive liberty, as a
normative and as a legal matter; and a series of examples of "good"
uses of cloning, based primarily on the benefits of its use as a
treatment for certain kinds of infertility.
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(1) Reproductive Liberty
One of the deepest consequences of the American belief in
liberty is that whatever is not prohibited is permitted. Implicit in that
approach is the idea that actions should not be prohibited without
good reasons. This general preference for liberty has special
resonance in the area of reproduction. Reproduction is an activity of
profound importance both to the individual and to society. Its special
significance lies in the fact that it generally commences with the
intimacy of coitus and always culminates in the creation of a child
who not only forges new relationships among individuals and
between families, but also serves to perpetuate society. For this
reason, some commentators, notably Professor John Robertson,
argue that individuals should possess the freedom to choose whether
or not to reproduce by means of somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning
so long as their actions do not cause any harm to others or pose a
threat to society.[18] "Procreative liberty includes a strong
presumptive right to have genetically related children noncoitally"
and "cloning may provide a useful [noncoital] alternative, unless
harmful." Of course, the Robertson test leaves open questions of the
extent of the necessary harm or threat, to whom the harm or threat
must be directed, and who should bear the burden of proof. Those
opposed to a ban on human reproductive cloning argue that this
reproductive method has not, or cannot, be shown to fail that test, at
least in some circumstances.
This argument from reproductive liberty might be made not only
as a general normative position but as a legal argument.
Reproduction is not only a basic human urge, but it may also qualify
as a fundamental liberty shielded from government intrusion by the
Constitution. The Supreme Court has already found a fundamental
right to avoid reproduction, whether by means of contraception or
abortion.' Some scholars infer a parallel fundamental right to
reproduce with the assistance of new technologies, including somatic
cell nuclear transfer cloning, an inference that is supported by broad
language in a number of contraception and abortion cases. In striking
down a statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried persons, for example, the Supreme Court declared: "If the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child."29  More recently, in
reaffirming the right to an abortion in 1992, the Court explained that
"[o]ur law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions
28. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972).
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relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education.
' 30
One other Supreme Court precedent offers support for a
fundamental right to procreate. In 1942 in Skinner v. Oklahoma ,
the Court invalidated a state statute that authorized the forcible
sterilization of persons thrice convicted of a felony involving moral
turpitude, declaring that "[m]arriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." But the
Skinner decision is "indeterminate," and "may be read in several
different ways, all of which are equally consistent with current
constitutional doctrine."32  The Court's ruling was quite narrow:
because the law permitted the sterilization of chicken thieves but not
embezzlers, the Court determined that it discriminated against certain
categories of criminals in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Thus Skinner may not even establish a right to be free from
compulsory sterilization, so long as the law is administered in a
nondiscriminatory fashion. Moreover, compulsory sterilization laws
implicate the same concerns regarding bodily integrity and social
equality that animated the Court in the contraception and abortion
decisions, thus they are distinguishable from laws regulating
medically assisted reproduction.3
At least one federal district court has interpreted these decisions
to establish a constitutional right to beget children with the assistance
of technology, including in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer
using a donated embryo, based upon the following reasoning: "[I]t
takes no great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of
constitutionally protected choices that includes the right to have
access to contraceptives, [19] there must be included within that
cluster the right to submit to a medical procedure that may bring
about, rather than prevent, pregnancy. ' ' 4
The constitutional argument about human reproductive cloning
is not frivolous, but neither is it powerful; it is not generally accepted
by constitutional scholars. The proponents of cloning support it as an
issue of unwarranted restriction of reproductive freedom. However,
it can be argued that the freedom to reproduce should not encompass
human reproductive cloning because it lacks the essential elements
that give reproduction meaning; it is neither coital nor collaborative,
and it does not involve the random recombination of genes to create a
30. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
31. Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942).
32. Lifchez v Hartigan, 735 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D.III. 1990), aff'd without opinion, sub
nom., Scholberg v. Lifchez, 914 F.2d 260 (7h Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 787 (1991).
33. Rao R. Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology,
UCLA L. Rev. 45:1077, 1112-13, 1998.
34. Rao R. Constitutional Misconceptions, Mich. L. Rev. 93:1473,1484,1995.
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child with a new and unique genetic identity. Although human
productive cloning may ultimately serve the same function as other
modes of reproduction by bringing into being a child, opponents
argue that it is radically different because it results in genetic
duplication-the replication of existing human beings. On this view,
cloning should be classified as "replication" rather than
"reproduction."
The supporters of human reproductive cloning cited the
constitutional protection of procreative decisions and methods as
justifying cloning. However, one reproductive right, i.e., human
reproductive cloning, does not necessarily follow from others, i.e.,
contraception, abortion. The Supreme Court relied heavily upon two
factors in the contraception and abortion cases that are conspicuously
missing from the cloning context. Because pregnancy entails a
massive invasion and occupation of a woman's body, constitutional
protection for the right to avoid reproduction is essential both to
safeguard bodily autonomy and to ensure gender equality. But these
precedents erect no constitutional barrier to a ban upon human
reproductive cloning, which neither results in invasion of the integrity
of the body nor endangers women's equality. Thus, the contraception
and abortion cases cannot be read to guarantee a constitutional right
to create a child with the assistance of technology.
Even if there were a fundamental constitutional right to
reproduce, such a right might not encompass human reproductive
cloning. On the one hand, some argue that cloning is clearly
procreative to the extent that it is used "to bear and beget a child."
Indeed, if procreation is important because it involves the passing on
of one's genes, one scholar suggests that "in comparison with the
parent who contributes half of the sexually reproduced child's genetic
formula, the clonist is conferred with more than the requisite degree
of biological parenthood, since he is the sole genetic parent."'35 Under
this view, cloning appears to merit at least the same degree of
constitutional protection as other assisted reproductive technologies.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has generally looked to
history and tradition to determine the contours of constitutional
protection. As a matter of history and tradition, sexual reproduction
seems to fall within "the private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter."3 Yet such an approach would probably afford little
protection to human reproductive cloning, which is radically different
from other technologies that serve as a substitute for reproduction by
35. Pizzulli FC, Asexual Reproduction and Genetic Engineering: A Constitutional
Assessment of the Technology of Cloning, S. Cal. L. Rev. 47:476,1974.
36. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,166 (1944).
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sexual intercourse because it is not sexual reproduction - it does not
involve sperm and eggs.[20]
If human reproductive cloning were deemed a fundamental right
under the U.S. Constitution, any state or federal laws regulating or
prohibiting cloning would be subject to the strictest scrutiny of the
judicial system. Governments could restrict cloning only for
compelling reasons, and any regulations would need to be narrowly
tailored so as not to infringe unnecessarily upon individual rights. As
a matter of existing federal constitutional law, however, the argument
for a right to human reproductive cloning seems weak. The Supreme
Court has never held that there is an affirmative right to reproduce
that is free from government regulation. Indeed, the power of the
Food and Drug Administration to regulate the safety of
contraceptives and abortifacients and of states to make reasonable
safety-based regulations for abortions seem well-established. The
California Constitution provides residents of California another
source of rights, including an express right to privacy, but, like the
U.S. Supreme Court, California's courts have never held that there is
a state constitutional right to be free from all regulation of
reproductive methods. It seems very unlikely that either the U.S.
Supreme Court or the California Supreme Court would rule human
reproductive cloning to be a fundamental right or liberty interest.
Thus, reasonable regulation of human reproductive cloning, including
a ban, would likely be upheld as constitutional if government could
show a rational basis for its policy.
(2) Examples of "Good" Human Reproductive Cloning
Discussion of human reproductive cloning has often focused on
evil or frivolous uses of cloning such as to create clones of Adolph
Hitler, of superior warriors, of excellent athletes, or of rich
egomaniacs. Supporters of human reproductive cloning have
responded by pointing out that, in the real world, cloning may serve
compelling human needs. They have drawn attention to more
sympathetic possible uses of the process. Three examples are
commonly used: human reproductive cloning as a treatment for
certain kinds of infertility, as a way of producing transplantable tissue
(typically bone marrow) to save another life, and as a way of coping
with the grief of a loved one's death. Some advocates for human
reproductive cloning have argued that cloning should be limited to
only certain approved uses. No one proposed to the Committee a
detailed plan for selecting the approved uses of cloning or the
approved parents, but at least two witnesses before the Committee,
Professors John Robertson and Glenn McGee, argued that cloning
should only be allowed for parents with some set of "good reasons."
We discuss below three arguably "good reasons."
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(a) Human Reproductive Cloning to Treat Infertility
Cloning could provide an innovative method to treat the
problem of infertility. Assisted reproductive technologies can help
many infertile couples, but people who do not produce viable
gametes - eggs or sperm - cannot produce children who are
genetically "their own." A couple where one member is infertile
from such a cause currently must turn to an egg or sperm donor in
order to create a child who is biologically connected to at least one
prospective parent. But human reproductive cloning affords the
power to produce a child with a genetic connection to at least one
parent, while simultaneously keeping the couple's relationship free of
the ghost of such third parties.[21] (Where one member of the couple
produces viable eggs, the clone might even have some genetic
contribution from each "parent" - nuclear DNA from one and
mitochondrial DNA, found only in the egg, from the other.)
Moreover, gay or lesbian couples might choose to clone for the same
reasons-in order to have children without relying upon third parties,
who may ultimately request parental rights and responsibilities.
Opponents of human reproductive cloning could respond that
couples who were infertile because of gametic inadequacy do have
other options for having children. They can adopt children. They can
use assisted reproduction methods using donated eggs or sperm.
Such donations might be particularly appropriate coming from a first
degree relative of the infertile person, who would share 50 percent of
his or her genome, thus producing a child who was 50 percent related
to one parent and 25 percent related to the other. These possibilities
raise both the question of what is meant by a child "genetically their
own" and whether such a desire should be supported.
On the other hand, whatever "children genetically their own"
means, the United States currently allows infertile couples to take
many steps to try to have such children. Proponents of human
reproductive cloning argue that it is unfair to single out one particular
group of the infertile and forbid them to use an advanced
reproductive technology that would help.
(b) Human Reproductive Cloning to Provide Transplants
The desire to clone is not confined to the infertile. A fertile
couple may resort to cloning in order to save the life of an existing
child, who desperately needs compatible cellular transplantation, e.g.,
bone-marrow, in order to survive. The parents may remove cells
from the dying child to clone another child who will be a perfect
match, resulting in two healthy children who happen to be identical
twins of different ages. (Of course, if the dying child's illness had
been caused by his genes, cloning would, in most cases, not be useful.)
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Opponents of human reproductive cloning sometimes invoke the
image of "organ farms" populated by "spare parts clones," who
would be a source for hearts, lungs, and other essential organs.
Killing or harming one human, whether or not a clone, for the
purpose of providing organs for another, they argue, is wrong. More
fundamentally, creating a child for that purpose is using that child as a
means to an end, not as an end in itself, and that, they contend, is also
wrong.
Proponents of human reproductive cloning present this scenario
not for irreplaceable organs like the heart, but instead about
transplants that involve little risk, notably bone marrow transplants.
Furthermore, they note that children already have been conceived
and born for the purpose of providing bone marrow or stem cell
transplants to their older siblings, either through conventional
conception or through in vitro fertilization. In at least one reported
case, parents used in vitro fertilization with pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis in order to ensure that the implanted embryos would be
able to provide matching tissue to their ill sibling. Proponents of
human reproductive [22] cloning argue that if we allow the creation of
tissue donor children in those ways, we should not ban their creation
through cloning. Proponents can also point out that children are
conceived from a wide variety of intentions or, in many cases,
accidentally, with no intention to start a pregnancy. The desire to
create a tissue donor child to save the life of its sibling is, they claim,
certainly better than many of the other reasons children are
conceived.
It is not clear how often this scenario would arise given the
availability of other treatments and other sources for bone marrow
and other tissues or organs. It might also be the case that, if
successful, non-reproductive human cloning could provide simpler
solutions to this problem by creating histocompatible cells or tissues
for transplantation into the patient whose cells provided the DNA
used to make the cloned cells.
(c) Human Reproductive Cloning to Replace a Loved-One
The first two examples are cases where human reproductive
cloning would be used for some motive other than, or in addition to,
creating a whole person who was genetically identical to another.
The couple that is infertile because of gametic inadequacy just wants
a child "of their own" and reproductive cloning might provide, they
think, the best way to reach that goal. Parents seeking a tissue
transplant want genetically identical tissue, but are not motivated by
the goal of having a genetically identical child. For them human
reproductive cloning is a means to a goal other than the production of
a child genetically identical to an existing person. The third example,
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however, is motivated by a desire for such an identical child. One
sympathetic version of the example might involve a couple with a
beloved young child. The "child dies and the parents, in their grief,
wish to have another child quickly, seeking perhaps in some way to
"replace" their dead child. Human reproductive cloning might allow
them to have a new child that was genetically identical to the first
child. They might believe that this genetic identity would help
assuage their grief and so seek to clone the first child.
Opponents point out that inherited genes are not
overwhelmingly powerful and that, therefore, the clone would not be
the same as the dead loved one. Furthermore, they argue that this
kind of "replacement" is not psychologically healthy for the parents
or for the second child. They also note that, when the second child
turns out not to be exactly the same as the first, the consequences for
the parents and the child could be negative. On the other hand,
proponents would counter that those who have not lived through the
tragedy of a dead child may not feel in a position to judge the actions
of parents who have.
B. Arguments Against Human Reproductive Cloning
In contrast to the arguments in favor of human reproductive
cloning, the arguments against it are both varied and numerous. They
fall into six broad categories: (1) possible physical harms to the cloned
embryos, fetuses, children, and gestational mothers; (2) possible
psychological harms to cloned children and others; (3) possible harms
to human society; (4) an inherent immorality or impermissible
unnaturalness of [23] human reproductive cloning; (5) pragmatic
difficulties in allowing cloning for only some reasons; and (6) a
majoritarian political argument. Each is discussed below.
(1) Physical Harms
All new drugs and biologics and many new medical devices must
be proven "safe and effective" to the satisfaction of the FDA before
they can be marketed in the United States. "Procedures," unlike
drugs, biologics, and medical devices, are not regulated by the FDA
and need not be demonstrated, to anyone, to be safe or effective
before their use.'
There is, as yet, no direct evidence concerning the safety of
human reproductive cloning. As far as is known publicly, such
cloning has never been tried. And, although the Dolly technique for
cloning has now been used regularly for cattle, sheep, goats, and mice,
37. Cohn V. A Perspective from the Press: How to Help Reporters Tell the Truth
(Sometimes). Statist. Med. 20:1341-1346, 2001.
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it has never been successfully used in any primates. Researchers at
Oregon State University cloned two monkeys using somatic cell
nuclear transfer with the cell nuclei taken from embryonic monkey
cells; no monkeys or other primates have been cloned using nuclei
from born primates. In spite of hundreds of efforts, those researchers
have been unable to establish another pregnancy by somatic cell
nuclear transfer using monkey nuclei from any source. As of June




There are serious theoretical reasons to be concerned about the
safety of reproductive cloning. These include, among others,
epigenetic changes in the donor cell's DNA39, which might not be
reversed in the cloning process; problems with maternal and paternal
imprinting of DNA in a clone0 ; accumulated damage in the DNA of
the donor somatic cel41; telomere length42; and problems with
reprogramming of the donor cell's DNA. None of these concerns
apply to natural reproduction or to the various existing forms of
assisted reproduction. Practical experience adds to these theoretical
concerns. In cattle and sheep, animals produced by somatic cell
nuclear transfer processes have shown a high level of deformity and
early death, as well as a very high rate of miscarriage. More than 90
percent of the embryos implanted fail to reach term; over 15 percent
of the animals born alive have serious birth defects. This compares
with a rate of serious birth defects of about 3 percent in humans. And
even apparently "normal" clones may have abnormal gene
regulation, leading Rudolf Jaenisch to testify to a National Academy
of Sciences panel that "most adult clones may have (at least subtle)
abnormalities. Completely 'normal' clones may be the exception.
44
In addition, in other cloned mammalian species the cloned
fetuses grow overly large in utero. This may pose a significant risk to
the woman carrying the fetus during gestation and at birth. Why the
38. Colman A. Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer in Mammals: Progress and Applications.
Cloning 1(4):185,1999/2000.
39. Kang YK et.al. Aberrant Methylation of Donor Genome in Cloned Bovine
Embryos. Nature Genetics 28:173, June 2001.
.40. Melton L. Womb Wars. Scientific American, p 24, Oct. 2000.
41. Liu L. Cloning Efficiency and Differentiation. Nature Biotechnology 19:406, May
2001.
42. Shiels PG et al. Analysis of Telomere Length in Dolly a Sheep Derived by Nuclear
Transfer. Cloning,1:119-124 (1999)
43. Eggan K et al. Hybrid Vigor, Fetal Overgrowth, and Viability of Mice Derived by
Nuclear Cloning and Tetraploid Embryo Complementation. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. 98:6214,
2001.
44. Jaenisch R. Testimony in the National Academy of Sciences Panel on Scientific
and Medical Aspecs of Human Cloning. April 7, 2001. (Accessed at
www.nationalacademics.org on August 7,2001.)
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fetuses grow so large is not known; some think it may be a result of
faulty nuclear reprogramming during the process of nuclear transfer.
Present evidence thus indicates but does not prove that human
reproductive cloning would be substantially less safe than either
natural reproduction or existing forms [24] of assisted reproduction.
But it quite clearly does not prove that it is safe and it does raise very
serious questions about the procedure's safety.
On the other hand, these standards of safety have not been
applied to other forms of advanced reproductive technology. In vitro
fertilization was not approved by the FDA before its use, nor was it
extensively tested in animals before experiments began in humans.
The same is true of many medical procedures that do not involve new
drugs or devices. Proponents argue that it is unfair and inappropriate
to subject this one procedure to a higher standard than similar
procedures - although that begs the question whether such proof of
safety should, in fact, be required broadly for reproductive
technologies.
Human reproduction is not entirely safe, for the child or for the
mother. Although modem medicine has greatly reduced infant and
maternal mortality rates, about half of one percent of newborns die
within a month of their birth. One or two percent live but have
serious birth defects. Furthermore, in the United States parents are
not forbidden to reproduce even when the children (or the mother)
will be at very high risk. A couple where each member carries a gene
for an autosomal recessive disorder - like cystic fibrosis, sickle cell
anemia, or Tay-Sachs disease - runs a 25 percent risk of having an
affected child. A couple where one member carries a gene for an
autosomal dominant disorder, like Huntington's disease, faces a 50
percent risk that each of their children will inherit that gene.
Similarly, parents with non-genetic health conditions that might be
transmitted to a child (HIV infection provides one example) are
allowed to put themselves and their future children in jeopardy by
becoming pregnant. Human reproductive cloning may be less risky
than at least some existing, and allowed, childbearing; advocates
argue that it should not be banned on this account as long as the
parents understand and accept the risks. On the other hand,
reproductive cloning involves a degree of premeditation that is often
missing from sexual reproduction and a substantial medical
intervention, which might distinguish it meaningfully from normally
commenced "at risk" pregnancies.
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(2) Psychological Harms
(a) Psychological Harms to the Cloned Child
Cloning by means of somatic cell nuclear transfer would make it
possible to produce a child who is virtually genetically identical to an
existing or previously existing person, i.e., a delayed genetic twin.
Many fear that this would inflict deep and lasting psychological
damage upon such a child. Some children may suffer from a loss of
uniqueness and a diminished sense of individuality and self esteem
grounded in the fact that he or she is the genetic copy of another
person. Others may be unduly burdened by heightened expectations
of parents and others. Thus cloning, it is argued, deprives the child of
the right to a unique identity and denies the child the right to an open
future.
Proponents of human reproductive cloning argue that common
experience with identical (or "monozygous") twins, whether reared
together or apart, provides a compelling counterexample to this
argument, for identical twins do not necessarily suffer psychological
injury as a result of their genetic similarity. A child who is created by
[25] reproductive cloning would be no less unique than an identical
twin. To the contrary, clones are likely to differ much more than
identical twins. Although a cloned child would possess almost the
same genotype as the genetic donor, he or she would result from a
different egg (with distinct mitochondrial DNA), gestate in a different
womb, and grow up in a different environment. The process of
cloning requires reprogramming of the genes of a specialized donor
nucleus. This process is apparently incomplete and is thought to
contribute to the high frequency of birth defects and miscarriages.
The result is there may be real differences in the ultimate DNA of the
clone.
Although identical twins share the same genome, opponents of
human reproductive cloning point to differences between clones who
are born and raised years apart and identical twins. Identical twins
begin life with a blank slate, equally ignorant of each other's destiny.
A cloned child, on the other hand, may start life with some
knowledge of what his genetic predecessor has already become. He
may feel much about himself or his fate is pre-determined, losing the
sense of freely constructing his own identity and choosing his own
future. Even if the clone does not believe in genetic determinism-
that our fate lies only in our genes-some people nevertheless fear
that the life of a cloned child would always be haunted by the shadow
of the original and unduly shaped and constrained by the expectations
of others. Hence, the child clone could be denied the "right to an
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open future" by having his future autonomy undermined by unfair
and over-zealous parental expectations.
A related concern is that the cloned child would become the
prisoner of these pre-set expectations that she will possess particular
traits or resemble the genetic donor in important ways. Even if such
expectations proved to be false, if they are widely shared by the
child's parents and by society, they risk becoming a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
In addition, because human reproductive cloning offers the
prospect of total control over reproduction-over the child's specific
genome-some fear that it would not only cause parents to harbor
unrealistic expectations but also to view their children more as objects
manufactured according to precise specifications than as independent
persons. To the extent that reproductive cloning fosters such social
attitudes, it may ultimately lead to the objectification of children who
will be treated as mere means to parental fulfillment, rather than as
ends to be loved and cherished for themselves.
Proponents of human reproductive cloning say it is difficult to
argue that cloning should be banned to protect against this
speculative harm. Parents of clones might have unrealistic
expectations of the clone, but this problem of "expectations" is not
unique to cloned children. Furthermore, it can be argued that parents
who go through the expensive and burdensome process of assisted
reproduction, including nuclear transfer, have a strong desire to lavish
parental love and care on any child that results. Many parents whose
children are the unwanted product of sexual conception are
objectified and treated as commodities the world over. The
motivations and behavior of a few parents are not a reason to ban a
neutral technology that is compatible with both good and bad
outcomes. What would be the consequences for the children if they
fail to live up to unrealistic expectations? Would they face the
rejection of their parents and the disappointment of [26] society?
This concern, proponents would argue, is not different in quality or
quantity from unreasonable expectations placed on some children
who are normally conceived. These harms are abuses that can be
combated by education and are not intrinsic to the technology.
Opponents, however, urge that the differences in expectations
between cloned children and other children are differences of kind,
not of degree. Regardless of one's belief in the role of genetics
behavior, parents who want to clone a child usually would do so in
order to have a child with a precise genetic make-up. Common sense,
it is argued, suggests that a parent, particularly if the child is the
parent's own clone, is unlikely to forget about that the child carries
his or her genome. For the cloned child to have such a parent may
threaten the cloned child's own self-image, as well as her sense of
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privacy. The argument that cloning deprives a child of the right to an
open future is based not simply on genetic determinism, but in part
on experience with genetic testing. Clinical geneticists and genetic
counselors often counsel against testing children for late onset genetic
disorders because a child who tests positive might grow up in a world
of limited horizons or suffer psychological harm. Insurers and
employers could hardly be expected to ignore information about the
clone's "genetic parent-twin". A basic family history of the cloned
child would take on much greater significance.
Some have expressed concern about the possible abusive nature
of certain utilitarian purposes for reproductive cloning, once the
procedure is considered safe for purposes of physical safety.
Examples could include creating a cloned child to provide organ and
tissue transplants, or to replicate an unusual or rare genotype
primarily to benefit the biomedical research community. In response
to this concern, others have pointed to the current laws against child
abuse which provide a basis for deterring abusive cases of
reproductive cloning. However, cases in which, for example, multiple
clones of a distinctive genotype are created, may present harms which
are not readily remediable after the fact by typical child abuse
statutes. To take an extreme example, if the parents of a dying
child-or researchers-wanted to clone a series of equally short-lived
children as replacements of a loved one until a cure could be found,
the state could consider asserting a legitimate preventive interest.
(b) Psychological Harms to the DNA Donor
Some argue that the fact that there exists another individual who
share the same genetic identity may inflict psychological harm not
only upon the cloned child, but also upon the person who provides
the genetic material. The person who is the source of the genetic
material (if still alive) may experience a loss of self worth rooted in
the knowledge that he or she is no longer unique, but now has a
genetic copy. Some genetic donors might see themselves reflected
and diminished in the body of the clone, thus producing a harm to
him that is the mirror image of the harm suffered by the clone. On
the other hand, some genetic donors may have opposite negative
psychological effects; a high sense of self-worth that led the donor to
want to clone himself might be reinforced in unhealthy ways.[27]
One mechanism to avoid or minimize such potential injuries is to
ensure that no one is cloned without first discussing the procedure
with an objective professional and obtaining informed consent.
Indeed, human reproductive cloning performed in the absence of
prior consent could even violate a moral or legal right.
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(c) Psychological Harms to Other Participants
Opponents of human reproductive cloning could argue that it
permits parenthood to be deconstructed into its component parts,
making it possible to separate the genetic, gestational, and rearing
functions. As a consequence, other participants in the cloning
process, such as egg donors, gestational surrogates, and the
individuals who intend to rear the child, could also suffer
psychological harms associated with the splintering of parenthood.
One might also worry about the possibilities of coercion or duress in
the procurement of somatic cells, egg cells, or surrogate mothers.
Indeed, it is even possible that people could be cloned without their
consent, which could cause substantial psychological damage.
On the other hand, proponents could note that many modes of
assisted reproduction pose the same risks, thus this objection is not
unique to cloning. It cannot justify a law singling out cloning for
special treatment while leaving artificial insemination, egg donation,
and gestational surrogacy entirely unregulated. They would argue
that, as with other forms of assisted reproduction, these risks should
be regulated by counseling, screening, informed consent, and so forth,
and not by prohibition.
(3) Harms to Society
Opponents argue that human reproductive cloning would have a
wide range of possible negative consequences for human society.
These include confusion of family relationships; encouragement of
genetic enhancement of children; distributive injustice;
encouragement of commodification of children; the loss of human
genetic diversity; overpopulation; and threats to democratic values of
individuality, privacy, and autonomy.
(a) Confusing Family and Generational Structures
The fact that human reproductive cloning would make it possible
to separate the genetic, gestational, and rearing functions also means
that there could be, on rare occasions, as many as five different
individuals who claim some biological connection to the child; the
genetic donor, the woman who provides the egg (which also includes
mitochondrial DNA), the woman in whose womb the clone is
gestated, and the biological progenitors of the persons who provide
the genetic material. Which of these many potential candidates
should be identified as the "parents" of the child? This is an issue
that needs statutory resolution since it is already the subject of case
law in surrogacy and embryo donation cases. If a cloned child is
actually a delayed genetic twin, is the genetic donor the child's sibling
or parent? This depends on how this society wants to define these
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terms. And are the parents of the genetic donor the child's parents or
grandparents? If a woman, for her second child, clones her mother, is
the first born child the clone's [28] sibling or grandchild? Opponents
of human reproductive cloning point out that these fundamental
questions highlight the ways in which human reproductive cloning
may confuse the structure of the family and blur generational
boundaries.
On the other hand, proponents argue that human cultures accept
many forms of familial relationship. In vitro fertilization and other
assisted reproductive technologies have already raised many of the
kinds of generational issues that cloning raises. The family has
already been the subject of much change. The census shows two-
parent families in the minority. While proponents contend that
human reproductive cloning introduces concerns similar to concerns
already present and tolerated by the law and society, opponents
respond that the potential for confusion of roles is greater when a
child may be a genetic twin of a parent.
(b) Encouraging Genetic Enhancement
Some are concerned that human reproductive cloning might
open the door to eugenics and to the systematic selection of genetic
traits in offspring. Reproductive cloning itself functions as a form of
genetic selection by making it possible to create a child with a known
genetic identity. With the mapping and sequencing of the human
genome, it may ultimately become possible to isolate and select the
genes responsible for a given trait. If functioning genes could be
inserted into the sperm, ovum, embryo, somatic cell or clone, the
genetic makeup could be altered. Rather than taking their risks with
the genetic lottery that is sexual reproduction, prospective parents
might choose to clone in order to control the genotype of their child
and perhaps of subsequent generations.
Opponents of human reproductive cloning have also worried that
parents would not choose wisely. Selection of certain physically
attractive characteristics attaches a value to physical appearance that
might devalue or disadvantage alternative phenotypes as persons or
as societal models. Cloning not only offers the power to select a
desired genetic phenotype, but also the power to produce multiple
copies of such persons. If cloning is combined with such forms of
genetic selection, some fear that science fiction images of the mass
production of individuals with particularly desirable genetic traits
could one day become a reality.
. Proponents counter that speculative application of eugenics after
human reproductive cloning does not in itself justify legal prohibition.
All that would be necessary, they assert, is regulation of introduction
of genes during or after the process. Genetic enhancement can be
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accomplished with or without human reproductive cloning and
reproductive cloning can be done with or without enhancement.
(c) Distributive Justice: Cloning only for the Rich
Because human reproductive cloning affords the ability to
control a child's genotype, unequal access to such technology could
exacerbate existing inequalities in our society. Reproductive cloning
would probably be quite expensive and it is not likely to [29] be
covered by health insurance. But if human reproductive cloning is
confined to those who can afford such a technology, only the wealthy
will be able to pass on their "genetic endowment" to their progeny in
perpetuity. If this genetic inheritance did, in fact, correlate strongly
with success in society, opponents of reproductive cloning fear that it
would pose the risk of a society with entrenched, virtually permanent
caste hierarchies. Judge Richard Posner, for example, projects that
reproductive cloning might tend to crowd out sexual reproduction
and, in so doing, aggravate inequalities in genetic endowment and
wealth, thus creating pressures for eugenic regulation.
In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court expressed concern about the
denial of public education to illegal alien children because this might
"promote the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates
within our boundaries." If educational equalities are troubling
because they could perpetuate a caste system, then what about
genetic inequalities? Thus widespread use of reproductive cloning
could result in a "DNA-divide," a society of genetic haves and have-
nots.
This argument depends on genetic inheritance correlating
strongly with success and on the widespread use, by the wealthy, of
human reproductive cloning. Societies already tolerate many
inequities, perhaps most easily seen in the United States in large
disparities in wealth or in access to health care. These also affect
children. For example, most people believe that a "good education"
correlates strongly with success and wealthy parents often try to buy
such an education for their children. Is reproductive cloning
different? In any event, proponents of human reproductive cloning
could argue that the potential for maldistribution of a safe and
effective technique is not a reason to ban the technique. There is
nothing in the nature of cloning technology that dictates it must be
available only to the rich; it could be allowed only if it were made
widely available.
(d) Commodifying Persons and Commercializing the Family
Some opponents argue that by placing a price tag on the cloned
child, human reproductive cloning threatens to commodify all
children. The danger these opponents see is that children will be
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regarded as fungible goods that are manufactured according to
precise specifications and traded on the market, rather than as unique
beings who are priceless. Opponents urge that, in so doing,
reproductive cloning also threatens to commercialize children and the
family, a realm which many believe should be shielded from the
economic values that govern the market. They contend that this kind
of commodification is already present in other assisted reproductive
technologies, particularly when third party gametes (eggs or sperm)
are sold based in part on the seller's attributes. Offers to pay $50,000
or more to desirable egg donors have been widely reported.
Reproductive cloning could present a strong form of this
commodification as it holds out the promise of delivering a "precise
product," a baby with a known genotype and not just an
unpredictable mixture of parental genes.
Proponents of reproductive cloning can respond that commerce
in clones could be banned. We do not forbid organ transplants
because of fears of commercialization; [30] instead, we ban the sale
and purchase of most organs and regulate their distribution. A
similar regulatory scheme could be implemented with respect to
DNA for use in reproductive cloning. Proponents contend that the
family is not shielded from economic values and commercialization
by current law. They argue that reproductive cloning, like other
things in society, can contribute in both positive and negative ways to
broad social problems, such as rampant commercialism, but it is not
so intrinsically unjust or commercialized that we need to criminalize it
on this account.
(e) Reducing Genetic Diversity
Reproductive cloning replicates an existing genome, preventing
the random recombination of genes that is a byproduct of sexual
reproduction. As a corollary, a few fear widespread use of
reproductive cloning to create children could ultimately reduce
genetic diversity in our society. A real reduction of genetic diversity
could have terrible consequences for humanity's ability to survive
changing environments, such as new diseases.
Proponents find this argument implausible. There are over 6
billion different human genomes in the world today. It seems very
unlikely that most people will choose to reproduce by cloning when
the alternative is so much easier and cheaper. But even if a large
fraction of the population did reproduce by cloning, there is no
reason to believe that they would all choose to clone the same few
people. On balance it seems unlikely that reproductive cloning will
substantially reduce our genetic diversity.
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(f) Increasing the Population
At the Committee's public hearings, at least two members of the
public argued that the world's population is already too big.
Reproductive cloning would only increase it, causing substantial
negative environmental effects. This argument seems weak.
Reproductive cloning still requires women to carry pregnancies to
term. Reproductive cloning would only increase the population if
women decided to have more cloned babies than they would
otherwise have had sexually-produced babies. The expense,
difficulties, and risks of reproductive cloning compared with sexual
procreation make this unlikely.
(g) Threatening Socially Important Values
Some argue that reproductive cloning threatens socially
important values such as individuality, privacy, and autonomy, values
that are crucial to a democratic society. By making more predictable
humans, opponents say, reproductive cloning undercuts our ideas of
free will. Seeing human clones, people will have less ability to feel
free and to act autonomously. This will in turn weaken political and
social institutions that seek to protect the rights of autonomous
individuals.
Proponents of reproductive cloning try to dismiss this argument
as based on an extreme view of genetic determinism. Clones, they
argue, would not be so much more [31] predictable than other people
as to shake society's faith in free will and the importance of the
individual.
(4) Human Reproductive Cloning Is Impermissibly Unnatural or Inherently
Immoral
During the March 28, 2001 congressional hearings on human
cloning, Rep. Clifford Stears asserted that "[h]uman cloning is a form
of playing God since it intervenes with the natural order of creation"
and "... is an unethical use of technology." This brief quotation
illustrates the two arguments that are perhaps most commonly
expressed against cloning technology: that reproductive cloning is
"unnatural" and that it is an affront to divine power. Certainly,
cloning could be considered "unnatural" as it relies on human
intervention in a "natural process., 45 It clearly runs counter to a
normally functioning natural environment, at least for mammals. It
does not provide for the random combination of genetic material
from eggs and sperm that is the essence of sexual reproduction. In
45. Post SG. The Judeo-Christian Case Against Cloning, in McGee G (ed), The
Human Cloning Debate, Berkeley; Berkeley Hills Books, 1998,1999.
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addition, it could theoretically render males reproductively obsolete.
All that is needed to clone a human being are human eggs, somatic
cell nuclei, and uteri; and a woman can supply all of these. A system
of reproduction that renders males obsolete also renders the
"natural" method of human reproduction obsolete. Those opposed
to human reproductive cloning on these grounds worry that the
process will run counter to and even harm nature. On this view, the
intent "to improve on nature" through reproductive cloning has been
considered an overstepping of natural limits, human "hubris of
enormous magnitude."'
Others note that humanity has been attempting to control nature
from the very beginning-agriculture, motorized transportation,
medicine all "interfere with nature." Over time, human intervention
into nature has been met with both rejoicing and resistance as it is
fraught with ambiguity-offering both remarkable good and ruinous
evil. American society has generally accepted that where science can
intrude into "the natural order" for good - to improve human life and
health, for example - it should do so. Many question the assumption
that there is a strong connection between a thing being "natural" and
it being "moral."47 Intrusion into the "natural order of things" is a
necessary component of human life. Although humans ought to take
responsibility for the impact of their decisions and activity on "the
natural order of things," the fact that cloning technologies intervene
in nature in and of itself seems an insufficient reason for prohibition
of human reproductive cloning.
A similar argument against human reproductive cloning rests on
the premise that the process and its outcome are contrary to God's
will. Reproduction, according to this argument, is solely God's
domain. When we take it upon ourselves to create humans through
reproductive cloning, we are infringing on the divine domain,
"playing God," as it were. On this view, finite and fallible beings
should not make decisions properly limited to the infinite and
infallible. Many religious accounts give humans the responsibility for
being caretakers of the rest of creation. The cloning of human beings
oversteps the limits of this responsibility and runs counter to the
responsibility itself. Furthermore, human beings produced through
cloning lack the unique and essential [32] quality of being conceived
through love. "With cloning, human life does not arise from an act of
love, but is manufactured in the laboratory to preset specifications
determined by the desires of others."' Finally, many religious critics
46. Council for Responsible Genetics, Position Statement on Human Cloning,
presented to the Committee by Paul Billings, MD, PhD, August 20,1999.
47. Roy I in The Human Cloning Debate, p 55.
48. Testimony of Richard M. Doerflinger, Senate Commerce Subcommittee on
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fear that human reproductive cloning will result in the use of cloned
humans for personal gain. Respect for human dignity-resident in
being created in the image of God-requires that a person be treated
as an end in him/herself, not as a means to fulfill the desires or goals
of another.
Proponents of reproductive cloning argue that the warning not to
"play God" is often invoked in the wake of a scientific development
so powerful that it threatens comfortable boundaries of human
action.49 As NBAC noted,50 ' this slogan is usually called upon as a
"moral stop sign" on the basis that: (1) humans ought not be probing
the mysteries of life; (2) decisiods regarding life's beginning and
ending belong to God; (3) humans are fallible and self-interested; (4)
humans have inadequate knowledge of outcomes which God alone
possesses; and (5) humans do not have the power to control processes
governed by divine omnipotence. Theologian Ted Peters argues52,
"The phrase 'playing God' has very little cognitive value ... from the
perspective of a theologian." Peters suggests that in common
parlance it has come to mean "stop." As such, it serves as a red light
potentially thwarting not only science but also thoughtful deliberation
about the direction and application of research. But it is precisely
careful deliberation that is needed in considering potential uses and
abuses of cloning technology. Peters and others" would argue that
"playing God," as it were, is precisely what God expects of humanity.
Humans are partners-"co-creators"-with God. As co-creators
humans have influence on and take responsibility for the direction in
which creation moves and changes-for better or worse. Although
there are a wide range of theological positions, it is not necessarily
wrong "to play God" in a humble and accountable way. From this
perspective, the admonition not to "play God" does well to remind
human beings of their fallibility and the importance of considered
constraint, but it alone is not sufficient argument for prohibition of
human reproductive cloning.
Science, Technology and Space, May 2,2001.
49. Pence G. Who's Afraid of Cloning, Lanham MD; Rowman and Littlefield. p 119
et. seq. 1998.
50.. Issues Raised by Human Cloning Research: Hearing Before the Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigation of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of
Representatives, March 28,2001, Serial No. 107-5, p 9.
51. NBAC, Cloning Human Beings 1, pp 42-43.
52. Peters T, Playing God? New York: Routledge, p 2,1997.
53. See for example, Hefner P. The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture and Religion.
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 35-42,1997.
54. Courtney Campbell, Religious Perspectives on Human Cloning in NBAC, Cloning
Human Beings II, D-1-D-64.




Finally, opponents of human reproductive cloning argue that the
consistent polling data reflecting a strong popular will against or
repugnance at human reproductive cloning can be viewed as a
collective refusal to give substitute or proxy informed consent in
behalf of cloned children to be subjected to such experimentation.
Similarly, opponents may argue that such public will can be
expressive of a widespread desire for societal control of certain
aspects of the genetic revolution that "cross the line." Opponents
urge that people may not always express their rationale for their
revulsion with the same arguments, but that the people "know it
when they see it". Under this view, human reproductive cloning is
obscene technological replication, not protectable procreative liberty.
(5) Pragmatic Difficulties with Permitting Some Human Reproductive
Cloning Subject to Regulation
Selective regulation is another policy option regarding cloning
for reproductive purposes. On its face, regulation may seem more
attractive than the alternatives of unrestricted use of reproductive
cloning or statutory prohibition. Regulation offers the [33] promise
of curbing abuses while allowing the technology to be used in certain
circumstances. In addition, those who find prohibition an
inappropriate use of governmental power may find regulation more
acceptable. To assess the option of regulation, we need to specify
what goals regulations are intended to accomplish, what kinds of
regulation are envisaged, and what the effects of proposed regulations
are likely to be.
The goals of regulation should be to eliminate or reduce
problematic cases of reproductive cloning. As discussed previously in
this report, some possible uses of reproductive cloning raise more
serious and widespread moral concerns than other uses. Many
citizens might oppose reproductive cloning in certain situations, but
accept it under other circumstances. First, reproductive cloning
would be ethically problematic if the clinicians carrying out the
procedure did not have appropriate training and skills. Poor quality
of care would compromise the safety of the woman who bears the
cloned child, as well as the well-being of children who may be born.
Second, reproductive cloning would be morally objectionable if the
individual who is cloned did not consent to the procedure. Lack of
consent would violate the autonomy and liberty of the person to be
cloned, undermining his or her right to decide not to have offspring
under those circumstances. Third, reproductive cloning would be
problematic if extremely large amounts of money were paid for
persons with specific phenotypic characteristics to provide nuclear
DNA for reproductive cloning. Such payments would commercialize
reproduction to the extent that the child is regarded as a commodity
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to be specified and purchased. These concerns about the quality of
care, informed consent, and commercialization might be termed
procedural in the sense that they would apply without regard to the
circumstances where reproductive cloning was sought.
Another group of moral objections focuses on the reasons
motivating reproductive cloning. Examples are reproductive cloning
in which the parents have very specific expectations for the
phenotype of the child, are planning to exert their utmost parental
power to have the child follow their plans, and would be deeply
disappointed if the child did not meet their expectations. For
instance, a person may desire to achieve so called "immortality" by
producing a child who is genetically identical and has the same
personality and occupation. Such cases raise concerns about
psychological harm to the particular child because of unrealistic and
excessive parental pressures. Also such cases are troubling because
they involve physicians in activities that are inconsistent with
important societal values. Such values include allowing children to
fulfill their individuality rather than cherishing them only to the
extent that they conform to parental expectations. This latter set of
objections might be termed substantive.
From a regulatory perspective, the challenge is to try to devise
regulations that would discourage or reduce these situations that raise
procedural or substantive concerns. What kinds of regulations might
be proposed? To address the first set of procedural concerns,
regulations might require licensing of facilities, certification of
practitioners, reporting of outcomes, informed consent from of all
parties involved in reproductive cloning (including the donor(s) of
nuclear DNA material, the egg donor, and the gestational mother),
and limits on excessive payments for eggs and nuclear DNA [34]
materials. Such regulations would help to ensure the quality of
services and appropriate informed consent. These kinds of
regulations are in place and are widely accepted for other medical
procedures.
To address the second class of substantive concerns, regulations
might require clinicians engaged in reproductive cloning to take some
steps to discourage cases in which parents will prize the child only to
the extent that it fulfills their specific expectations. At a minimum,
practitioners might be required to educate and counsel patients
seeking reproductive cloning about the concerns raised about this
method of reproduction, particularly concerns about excessive
parental expectations for the child. This requirement would help
ensure that decisions for reproductive cloning are truly informed and
would increase the likelihood that children born of this technology
would have opportunities to shape their own futures. However,
education and counseling leave it to the parents to decide whether to
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continue to seek cloning for these purposes. Such regulations for
education and counseling would be similar to current mandates for
physicians to counsel patients before obtaining genetic testing or
prenatal testing for birth defects.
Other regulations might go even further, to require clinicians to
discourage reproductive cloning if parents desire a child with
predetermined phenotypic characteristics. Furthermore, regulations
might explicitly allow clinicians to decline to participate in cases of
reproductive cloning in which, in their judgment, parents will try
strenuously to foreclose the child's options that are incompatible with
their expectations. Under regulations to discourage instances of
excessive parental expectations, practitioners would evaluate the
intention and motive of those seeking reproductive cloning. There is
some precedent for clinicians making recommendations regarding
specific reproductive decisions in requirements for physicians to
recommend or obtain prenatal testing for syphilis, rubella immunity,
Rh incompatibility, and HIV infection. However, having third parties
evaluate the motives for reproductive decisions raises its own set of
ethical problems, as we next discuss.
Well-intentioned regulations may be problematic because they
are inefficient or have unacceptable burdens and unintended
consequences. Regulations to discourage cases of excessive parental
control may be inefficient in several ways. They may be overly broad
to achieve their goal, because in many cases the feared harms will not
occur. Parents who at the onset seek to produce a child with certain
specified characteristics may change their minds and love the child as
a unique individual as the child develops its own characteristics. As
with children born through sexual reproduction, parents are likely to
learn through experience that children usually develop their own
interests and characteristics, despite parents' expectations and
upbringing. At the same time, regulations to discourage cases of
excessive parental control may also be too narrow to achieve their
goal. It is possible that parents who at the onset say that they will
cherish their child no matter how he or she turns out may react
differently when they see a child who cannot be distinguished
physically from an existing individual. Faced with this close
resemblance, parents may develop strong expectations that they
could not predict and therefore did not discuss during prenatal
counseling. Moreover, if the goal is to [35] moderate excessive
parental control and expectations, regulations dealing with
reproductive cloning will miss the far greater number of cases in
which parents have excessive expectations for children conceived
through sexual reproduction or other forms of assisted reproduction.
It is possible by regulation to try to restrict access to reproductive
cloning solely to couples who are infertile or at some genetic risk.
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These would be parents whose reasons for seeking to clone would not
revolve around seeking a genetic duplicate for a pre-existing person.
At least two of the witnesses before the Committee, Professor John
Robertson and Dr. Glenn McGee, argued for such systems.
However, there is no guarantee that access would be so carefully
controlled. Potential broad based use of reproductive cloning raises
concern among many that market forces, genetic determinism, and
undue emphasis on genetic relatedness could be unintended
consequences.
In addition, regulations designed to discourage or prevent most
morally troubling cases of reproductive cloning may have detrimental
consequences. First, such regulations may be burdensome and invade
privacy, whether implemented by physicians or in a legal setting.
When physicians currently discuss with patients reproductive
decisions, they are usually non-directive in the sense that the
physician lays out options, points out issues for the patients to
consider, but leaves the final decision to them. If clinicians seek to
discourage certain types of reproductive cloning, discussions would be
directive. However, it is troubling if physicians evaluate the motives
and intentions of persons making reproductive decisions and seek to
discourage certain decisions. Reproductive decisions are personal
and private. Persons engaging in sexual reproduction are not asked
to justify their intentions. Many would consider it disrespectful and
intrusive-an invasion of privacy-to ask people to justify their
reasons for such personal decisions. Furthermore, there is the risk
that because of the power imbalance in the doctor-patient
relationship, physicians and counselors may impose their own
personal values about parenting onto patients who do not share their
view. Moreover, it is difficult to specify precisely every situation of
unacceptable reproductive cloning. Such vagueness in classifying
acceptable and unacceptable actions may give physicians so much
discretion that their recommendations are arbitrary and unfair.
Forced to determine the acceptability of unusual cases, with no
precedents to turn to, physicians may fall back on their own personal
values. These values may be controversial to others. For instance,
some clinicians may want to restrict reproductive cloning to parents
who are married or whose general values correspond to their own.
Limiting access to medical services solely on the basis of personal
beliefs, however, is difficult to justify as good public policy or an
acceptable component of professional standards.
The decision whether to allow reproductive cloning could be
placed in the hands of a governmental body, something akin to a
licensing board or a family court. (Dr. McGee argued that the
process could be made akin to judicial adoption procedures.) Taking
the decisive role away from the physician mitigates some concerns,
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but not all. The grounds on which a governmental body would decide
who could or could not have [36] children through cloning would
likely remain both vague and subject to "gaming" by eager parents.
And citizens may be particularly reluctant to set a precedent of
having reproductive decisions made by the government or made
under governmentally-sanctioned standards for "appropriate"
reproductive decisions.
Another problem is that substantive regulations may be
ineffective and have unintended adverse consequences. Knowing
that certain "reasons" for reproductive cloning are considered
unacceptable, patients who are eager to use it for these purposes may
misrepresent their reasons in order to gain access to the technology.
Since such misrepresentation would be extremely difficult to detect,
the regulations may not have their intended goal of discouraging
reproductive cloning for more morally troubling reasons. In the long
run, then, regulations may not achieve their desired goals but may
lead to cynicism as well as intrusion into private matters.
In light of these difficulties, people will disagree over the
desirability of regulation of reproductive cloning. These
disagreements need to be considered in the context of specific types
of regulations that might be envisaged. Procedural regulations
regarding quality of care and informed consent raise few objections.
Some citizens will believe that such procedural regulations provide
adequate protection with acceptable burdens and side effects. Others
who are concerned about abuses of reproductive cloning might
consider additional substantive regulations. While some may judge
substantive regulations desirable, others may reject them because
they are ineffective or have unacceptable side effects. Persons who
reject substantive regulations face a dilemma: is it preferable to
prohibit reproductive cloning altogether or to permit it with only
procedural regulations. The decision hinges on whether it is
considered better to allow reproductive cloning, accepting that some
persons will seek it for morally troubling reasons, or to prohibit
reproductive cloning, accepting that persons will not be able to obtain
it for reasons that many would find acceptable. Faced with this
dilemma, some persons might reasonably conclude that the abuses of
reproductive cloning would be so frequent and egregious as to justify
a ban on reproductive cloning. Others would argue that the harms of
regulated reproductive cloning are acceptable and do not justify such
a restriction on reproductive rights.
Given the depth and breadth of concerns expressed both locally
and globally, it is important to exercise caution when considering
regulation of reproductive uses of human cloning technology. Even if
a compelling argument is made in a particular case, it does not
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necessarily follow that reproductive cloning is justified or desirable in
general.
(6) A Political Argument
One thing that is clear about human reproductive cloning is that
most Americans, and most Californians, oppose it. The survey results
vary according to how the question is asked, but they consistently
show large majorities against human reproductive cloning. One could
argue that the popular will, even if it did not have a compelling basis,
may be sufficient for a law banning cloning. Some people might
conclude, now or at some point after the physical safety of cloning
had been demonstrated, that the arguments against [37] cloning are
not very strong. If no substantial rights are being infringed, a
government might ban things solely because its citizens do not like
them. This might be the case at the local level, for example, with
some zoning regulations that dictate the aesthetic attributes of a
neighborhood. California state law may provide another example. In
1998, California, by referendum, banned the sale of horse meat for
human consumption. The arguments for banning horse meat seemed
mainly to have been a popular prejudice in favor of horses, but the
"right" of people to eat horsemeat seemed weak. One might view
human reproductive cloning similarly and so believe that, in light of
weak arguments in favor of human reproductive cloning, the public's
preferences should be respected.
This position seems unlikely to be popular. Proponents of
reproductive cloning will insist that reproduction, through cloning or
otherwise, does involve important interests and should not be
prohibited without good reason. Most opponents of reproductive
cloning will be confident that there are good reasons for a ban. But
for those without confidence in either side's arguments, a decision to
ban human reproductive cloning based purely on public preference
may be justifiable.
C. Our Conclusions
The Committee believes that California should ban human
reproductive cloning. Every Committee member finds the safety
concerns about human reproductive cloning compelling and would
forbid the technology unless or until it were shown safe. We all also
accept some of the other arguments against human reproductive
cloning, though different members of the Committee find different
arguments persuasive. We recognize that both the science of human
reproductive cloning and the ethical discussions concerning it are
likely to change in coming years. These considerations led some
members to consider another moratorium, banning reproductive
cloning for another period of years. Ultimately, we concluded that
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the Legislature should pass, and the Governor should sign, a flat ban
with no expiration date. A subsequent Legislature and Governor
could, of course, allow human reproductive cloning based on new
information or changed views. We concluded that, with this
technology, the burden of going forward should fall to those who seek
to convince the State to make such a change. [38]
H. California Should Not Prohibit but Should Reasonably
Regulate Human Non-Reproductive Cloning
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee unanimously agrees that California should not
prohibit but should reasonably regulate human non-reproductive
cloning. We believe that use of this technology offers potential
medical and scientific benefits while not raising many of the same
concerns as human reproductive cloning. Such uses might include
cloning technology as a source of human stem cells that would not be
rejected by a patient's immune system. California should regulate all
human non-reproductive cloning in the State, public or private. That
regulation should do at least three things: a) prohibit the use of pre-
embryos after development of the primitive streak, b) ensure that the
persons providing cells for this purpose gave informed consent, and c)
require that the research be permitted by an approved Institutional
Review Board ("IRB").56
We define non-reproductive human cloning as the transfer of
human cell nuclei into enucleated oocytes to produce human pre-
embryos without implanting the pre-embryos to produce a human
child. Such a process would likely be used to create early pre-
embryos to be used as sources of embryonic stem cells. As set out
below, we would limit the use of such pre-embryos to the period
before the appearance in the pre-embryo of the so-called primitive
streak, which occurs 14 to 18 days after the pre-embryo's creation.
This developmental stage has also been termed the blastocyst or pre-
embryo. 7
Human embryonic development is a complicated process.' The
current scientific description of this process defines its terms carefully.
56. One Committee member, Francis Pizzuili, would go further in stipulating the
substance of IRB review. His views on this point are set out separately at page 49.
57. US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Ethics Advisory Board.
Report and Conclusions: HEW Support of Research Involving Human In Vitro
Fertilization and Embryo Transfer. Washington, DC: Department of Hew, Ethics
Advisory Board, 101, 1979; American Fertility Society, Ethics Committee. Research on
Preembryos: Justifications and Limitations. Fertil Steril 53(2 Suppl):62S-63S, 1990.
58. Moore KL, Persaud, TVN. The Developing Human: Clinically Oriented
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The term "pre-embryo" is used to refer to an entity in a stage of
development that begins after fertilization and ends approximately 14
days later with the appearance of the primitive streak. 9 The primitive
streak is a band of cells at the caudal, or "tail," end of the embryonic
disc from which the embryo develops. Its appearance is a crucial step
in the development of an organism out of the sphere that is the pre-
embryo. At the time the primitive streak appears, the pre-embryo is
about one millimeter in size, roughly the size of the dot on the letter
"i" in this text. If inserted in a uterus, it would rarely result in a live
birth.
Various committees, in the United States and elsewhere, that
have studied embryo research have concluded that the appearance of
the primitive streak marks an important step in the moral status of
the pre-embryo, and hence, the ethical arguments concerning pre-
embryo research. Only about 40 percent of fertilized eggs ever reach
the primitive streak stage.6° Before the appearance of the primitive
streak, the pre-embryo is not necessarily one individual - it could lead
to identical twins. The development of a nervous system and any
possibility of feeling sensations comes much later than the
appearance of the primitive streak. For these reasons, many such
committees have [39] suggested limiting embryonic research to about
14 days or the appearance of the primitive streak. For example, in
1994, the Human Embryo Research Panel of the NIB recommended
that federal funding of embryo research be allowed under three
conditions: (1) that the pre-embryos were less than 14 days old; (2)
that the information which was sought could not be obtained by
studies performed with animal embryos or other experimental
designs; and, (3) that scientists could demonstrate a compelling
reason for performing the studies.6' These conditions have to be
demonstrated to a committee for the protection of human research
subjects (Institutional Review Boards), meeting the requirements of
federal regulations.
The remainder of this section of our report discusses arguments
for human non-reproductive cloning, then arguments against it,
before discussing the Committee's conclusions. The arguments are
generally summarized with their counter-arguments.
Embryology. 5 ed. Philadelphia: WB Saunders, 2934,1993.
59. McCormic RA. Who or What is the Preembryo? Kennedy Institute of Ethics
Journal 1(1):1-15, 1991.
60. Wilcox AJ, Weinberg CR, O'Connor JF, Baird DD, Schlatterer JP. Incidence of
Early Loss of Pregnancy. N Engl J Med 319:189-194, 1988.
61. Jones PBC. Funding of Human Stem Cell Research by the United States. EJB:
Electronic Journal of Biotechnology [online]. Volume 3, No. 1, p 30, 15 April 2000,
Available from: www.ejb.orglcontentlvol3/issuel/full/3/index.html. ISSN 0717-3458.
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A. Arguments in Favor of Human Non-Reproductive Cloning
(1) General Benefits to Human Health and Medicine
The arguments in favor of human non-reproductive cloning are
scientifically complicated but, as matters of policy, quite simple.
Research using this technique holds substantial promise of preventing
and alleviating human disease, disability, and premature death. Non-
reproductive cloning technology might be able to create populations
of functional new cells to replace those damaged through wear and
tear or disease. Undifferentiated human pluripotent stem cells
obtained from donated pre-embryos have been coaxed into becoming
neurons, liver cells and heart muscle cells, all of which appear to
function normally in vitro. In light of these potential benefits, NBAC
recommended that research on embryonic stem cells continue and be
eligible for federal funding.
The possible uses of cloning technology to produce stem cells are
numerous and varied. Such non-reproductive cloning could be used
for basic research into human embryology and reproductive biology.
The following are examples of this kind of research:
* Increasing knowledge about embryogenesis, i.e., embryo
formation, and the development of birth defects
* Developing a better understanding of the biology of human
implantation
* Understanding better the causes of spontaneous abortion
* Developing more effective or simpler forms of contraception
* Improving methods of in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment for
both male and female infertility
• Developing pre-embryo biopsy and sampling techniques for pre-
implantation diagnosis of genetic or chromosomal abnormalities
[40] Improved understanding of these processes might have
benefits in preventing birth defects and in aiding, or preventing,
pregnancy.
(2) Avoiding Immune Responses to Transplanted Tissue
A second and more discussed area of use of non-reproductive
human cloning involves cloning in conjunction with the use of human
embryonic stem cells. The science behind human embryonic stem
cells was discussed briefly in the background section, above. Its
promise is immense, although still speculative. But if (1) embryonic
stem cells can produce cells and tissues useful in medical therapy, but
(2) those cells or tissues trigger an immune response in the patient,
then (3) the use of human non-reproductive cloning to produce stem
cells with the patient's own DNA might avoid that immune response.
Any or all of those steps may not occur. Alternatively, other cells,
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such as adult stem cells, or other processes, such as transferring the
patient's DNA into an embryonic stem cell rather than into an
enucleated egg, might avoid any need for human non-reproductive
cloning. Nonetheless, at this point such cloning looks like it may be
very important to the usefulness of potential stem cell therapies.
As important as it is to consider questions of the extent of moral
respect due to the human pre-embryo, proponents of non-
reproductive cloning claim that the potential benefits of stem cell
technologies make it equally important to consider the cost of not
using embryonic cells. If someone suffers a life threatening illness
and dies because nothing can be done, there is no moral culpability.
If, however, the development of life sustaining therapy and treatment
is restricted, then proponents of human non-reproductive cloning
might argue that those members of the public who support such
constraints bear some responsibility for those patients they have
determined not to help.
Opponents of human non-reproductive cloning do not deny its
potential scientific and medical benefits, although they do point out,
quite accurately, that many of those benefits are speculative and, if
they emerge at all, will not appear soon. Instead, they generally urge
that the same or similar benefits could be obtained from using cells
that do not require the destruction of pre-embryos, such as adult
multi-potent stem cells.
The value of those cells, however, is at least as uncertain as the value
of cells created by human non-reproductive cloning.62
B. Arguments Against Human Non-Reproductive Cloning
At least four arguments can be made against human non-
reproductive cloning. Most of them are the same as more general
arguments against the creation or use of human pre-embryos and
embryos in research. To the extent human non-reproductive cloning
is used in such research, it is necessarily subject to those arguments.
One argument, however, applies only to non-reproductive human
cloning and not to other research with created pre-embryos. We
discuss that argument first.
(1) Human Non-Reproductive Cloning Will Lead to Human [41]
Reproductive Cloning
Many people are concerned not so much with the beneficent use
of pluripotent stem cells to treat and cure disease but of the potential
abuses of this technology. Such an argument was expressed by Judy
62. Coleman, A. Somatic Cell Transfer in Mammals: Progress and Applications.
Cloning 1, 185-200, 2000; Simpson, AJ. The Natural Somatic Mutation Frequency and
Human Carinogensis. Adv Cancer Res 71,209-240, 1997.
July 2002]
Norsignian, Executive Director of the Boston Women's Health Book
Collective, in her testimony to the House Committee on energy and
Commerce regarding the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001 on
June 20, 2001. "While we do not oppose the use of human embryos
for valid medical research, including their use to generate embryonic
stem cells, we do oppose the creation of clonal human embryos. To
allow this procedure would make it all but impossible to enforce the
ban on the creation of fully formed human clones. Further, it would
open the door to other, more profound forms of human genetic
manipulation."
This is a form of slippery slope argument that suggests that
taking the initial step (in this case, allowing the creation of pre-
embryos for research including the development of cells and tissues
for transplant) necessarily results in an action determined to be wrong
(in this case, the use of human cloning to produce a child). Because a
possible outcome or application is wrong, the argument goes, the first
step ought not to be taken. One could argue that human non-
reproductive cloning could lead to reproductive cloning in two quite
different ways; it is not clear that either path is plausible.
One argument is that the presence of cloned human pre-embryos
in research laboratories will make it substantially easier for someone
to attempt reproductive cloning - the cloned pre-embryos will already
have been created. If viable human pre-embryos can be created by
nuclear transfer cloning - an as-yet unanswered question - that
process seems unlikely to prove difficult. The ability to "harvest"
eggs exists at hundreds of IVF clinics around the country; the nuclear
transfer step, though not efficient, seems unlikely to be difficult to
learn. In any event, those who seek to have a cloned baby are likely
to want a clone of a particular person and not any cloned pre-embryo
found in a laboratory.
In addition, reproductive cloning requires that cloned pre-
embryos be implanted into willing gestational mothers. The difficult
steps are likely to be finding those willing gestational mothers and
performing the implantation successfully. Research on pre-embryos
before the primitive streak forms would provide little guidance to
would-be reproductive cloners on whether such cloned pre-embryos
would develop to term and how best to implant. Regulation of
reproductive cloning arguably could focus more easily on recruitment
of gestational mothers and implantation rather than on creation of
cloned pre-embryos.
The slippery slope argument has a second variation. One could
argue that human non-reproductive cloning would make reproductive
cloning more likely by making the public accustomed to, and
accepting of, the idea of human cloning. For this argument to be true,
people would need not to distinguish strongly between the creation of
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pre-embryos and the creation of babies. Although some people,
notably those who believe the strong form of the moral status of pre-
embryos, do equate the two, it seems unlikely [42] that most people
will. Public acceptance of non-reproductive cloning used to make
liver or heart cells seems to us unlikely to breed public acceptance of
cloned babies.
(2) The Moral Status of the Pre-Embryo
The developments in nuclear transfer and stem cell technologies
outlined above have sparked hope that new effective therapies will
become available to treat human disease and relieve suffering.
However, they have also raised deep ethical and religious concerns
inherent in research with human pre-embryos and cadaveric fetal
tissue.63 These concerns center on the moral status of the persons, or
objects, created by human non-reproductive cloning. The arguments
come in both a strong form, which considers the pre-embryo itself
entitled to full human rights and hence cannot be created for the
purposes of research, and a weaker form, which holds that it is
entitled to some more limited respect.
Edmund Pellegrino, in testimony to NBAC regarding the
derivation and use of human embryonic stem cells, nicely summarized
the core claims of the strong argument from the pre-embryo's moral
status.
... [H]uman life is a continuum from the one-call stage to death.
At every stage, human life has dignity and merits protection.
... [T]he embryo would be treated as a means to an end. Its
inherent moral status is violated because it must be killed in order
to obtain stem cells. There is no moral or legal basis for subjecting
any member of the human species to harm or death in non-
therapeutic research based on prediction that it will die anyway, no
matter how certain that prediction might be.'
This perspective is based on the acceptance of the status of the
human pre-embryo as a fully human person. On this view, which
grants the pre-embryo moral status equivalent to that of an infant or
adult, the full moral rights and protections of personhood are
bestowed at the moment of conception. Therefore, any procedure
which results in direct harm to the pre-embryo may not be
undertaken even in pursuit of a good end for someone else. This
concern has two parts. First, using the pre-embryo as a means to
benefit others is wrong in itself; second, the pre-embryo's informed
63. Charo RA. The Hunting of the Snark. The Moral Status of Embryos, Stanford
Law and Policy Review 1:38,1995; McGee G and Caplan AL. What's on the Dish. Hasting
Center Report, p 3 6. March, April 1999.
64. National Bioethics Advisory Commission. Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell
Research, Volume III. Rockville, Maryland 2000:F-3, F-4.
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consent is not, and cannot be, obtained. Both violate human dignity.
Nonetheless, many who hold this view seemingly recognize the
promise of stem cell research as Pellegrino indicates:
The Commission should instead [of legitimizing embryonic stem
cell research] strongly encourage the funding and development of
alternative sources of stem cells-those that do not depend on the
destruction of living human embryos or make use of cells from
induced abortions. In light of the rapid developments in this field,
the possibility and probability of the development of morally
acceptable sources of stem cells is a reality.65 [43]
The argument from the weaker moral status of the pre-embryo
differs from the full personhood view just described. This
developmental view of moral status posits that an individual acquires
interests, rights, and roles incrementally as his or her development of
sentience, consciousness and relationships justifies these safeguards.
Based on the developmental continuum from pre-embryo to adult
and the "symbolic" value of pre-embryos as human "beginnings," the
human pre-embryo deserves "profound respect" but not the
protections associated with full personhood. This position could also
lead to arguments against human non-reproductive cloning, but has
more often been used to support such research.6
Arguing that human pre-embryos are alive and are valued,
Meyer and Nelson have suggested that while the human pre-embryo
commands "minimal but real" respect and cannot, for example, be
considered property, its destruction need not display disrespect.67
Their account grants that human pre-embryos deserve respect in all
circumstances, even when destroyed for good reasons. Examples of
restrictions on the treatment of pre-embryos that would demonstrate
such respect include the use of pre-embryos only if the research goals
cannot otherwise be obtained and only if the pre-embryo is less than
14 days old.
Discerning the moral status of human pre-embryos is a matter of
profound perplexity and debate. David H. Smith opines that, "The
fact is we really don't know what they are, and our obligations are
indeterminate. We are in a new territory, collectively feeling our
way."6' In such an atmosphere of ambiguity and potential benefit, it
appears appropriate to try to work out incrementally and with great
65. Ibid. F-5.
66. Robertston JA, Symbolic Issues in Embryo Research, Hasting Cen[t]er Report,
23:37-38, 1995.
67. Meyer MJ, Nelson IJ. Respecting What We Destroy: Reflections on Human
Embryo Research. Hastings Center Report, 31:16-23,2001.
68. Smith DH. Creation, Preservation and all the Blessings .... Anglican Theological
Review, 81:584-585,2001.
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care the kinds of pluripotent stem cell research that are morally
justified. 9
(3) Protection of Egg Donors
If donated human eggs are needed to create cloned pre-embryos,
research and clinical success of human non-reproductive cloning will
necessarily increase demand for such eggs - and increase the
pressures on women to provide them. Egg donation is not an entirely
benign process. It requires the use of ovulation producing drugs and
entails specific rates of super-ovulation. The egg retrieval procedure
bears a significant set of risks. In return, the donors would receive no
personal health or monetary benefits from a potentially harmful
procedure used to benefit others.'
The donor's informed consent is also a concern. Some women
are vulnerable to pressures to participate in research or to help the
infertile. There is reason to believe that egg donation has already
been subject to abuse by the assisted reproduction industry.
Payments have been made that exceed compensation for the costs of
participation and actually amount to payment for the egg itself. This
commercialization does not respect the participants in the process.
As Cynthia Cohen notes: "It takes little imagination to foresee the
primary means for getting women to provide eggs for the purposes of
[non-reproductive cloning] will have to involve coercion of those in
the process of attempting to have children by means of the new
reproductive technologies."'' To avoid economic [44] and other
forms of coercion, there should be safeguards for the well-being and
freedom of choice of the women providing eggs.
(4) Distributive Justice
The last argument revolves around access to the fruits of human
non-reproductive cloning. It can be argued that justice requires
society to ensure that the benefits of medical science be distributed
fairly with particular attention paid to those consistently marginalized
by the health care system. The benefits of the regenerative medicine
that non-reproductive cloning makes possible should not further
polarize health status and access to care. In her testimony to this
Committee, Patricia Baird spoke of the "seventh generation rule"
69. Juengst E and Fossel M. The Ethics of Embryonic Stem Cells - Now and Forever,
Cells Without End, JAMA 284:3180,2000.
70. Garmankin A. Who Will Protect Egg Donors? Penn Bioethics 5(2) Summer 1998.
71. Assisted Reproductive Technologies Analysis and Recommendations for Public
Policy. The New York State Task Force on Life and in Law, April 1998.
72. Cohen CB. Ethical Questions About the Uses of Embryos and Women in




which is applicable here-decisions are to be made not solely based
on immediate gratification but with concern for the costs and benefits
accrued for children and seven generations to come.
73
C. Our Conclusions
We believe that the enormous medical promise of stem cells to
relieve human suffering makes a compelling ethical case for the
pursuit of many lines of research. Human non-reproductive cloning,
which might prove essential to effective stem cell therapy, is one such
line of research. The moral scale weighing harms to a limited number
of pre-embryos on one side against potentially hundreds of thousands
of affected and clearly morally significant humans, on the other hand,
can, it seems to us, justify the use of pre-embryos in this work. To
ban such research would, to many of us, be itself unethical.
On the other hand, there are appropriate concerns about this
kind of research. We believe, therefore, that California should
regulate the use of human non-reproductive cloning. In particular, it
should take steps to ensure that all such research done in California,
whether publicly or privately funded, be approved by appropriate
Institutional Review Boards or their equivalents. It should require
that the egg donors, and the donors of the cells whose nuclei are
transplanted, give real and appropriate informed consent. And, from
a sense of caution about the moral status of the pre-embryo, we join
other groups in recommending that such research be limited to pre-
embryos in which the primitive streak, an essential early sign of
development, is not yet present.[45]
IV. Implementation Issues
RECOMMENDATIONS
In banning or regulating human cloning, California may be
affected by actions of the federal government. Federal regulation
needs to be watched carefully to ensure that California's actions are
both necessary and appropriate. The actions of other states, which
might provide experience useful to the California regulatory plan,
should also be watched.
Regulating a scientific field undergoing rapid change is difficult
for a legislature. The California Legislature should define the terms
of its prohibition on human reproductive cloning carefully and its
regulation of human non-reproductive cloning carefully but broadly.
73. Baird PA. Testimony Before the California Advisory Committee on Human
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It should delegate the implementation, including further definition, of
that regulation to a state agency.
The Committee strongly believes that California will increasingly
face complex challenges arising from genetic and reproductive
technologies. "Cloning" by embryo-splitting is one of many such
technologies. We recommend that California establish an on-going
mechanism to advise the Governor and the Legislature on this and
related issues of human biotechnology.
The Committee's discussions raised several questions concerning
how California should implement a policy about human cloning.
These questions have led to three recommendations.
A. Issues of Federalism
The federal government has not yet acted to prohibit human
reproductive cloning, although the FDA has asserted jurisdiction over
it. Federal actions might make legislation by California unnecessary
or even, under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, invalid.
California should watch federal legislation and regulation carefully
and take it into account in its own actions.
If the federal government were to ban reproductive cloning, a
similar action by California would probably be unnecessary. Such
legislation could still have some benefits. It is possible that federal
legislation prohibiting reproductive cloning might be held invalid as
beyond the powers granted Congress by the Constitution's
Commerce Clause. In that event California legislation could be
effective when federal legislation was not. It is conceivable, though
very unlikely, that federal legislation could be invalidated on the
grounds that it violates a federal constitutional right to clone. In that
case, similar legislation by California would almost certainly be
similarly invalid.
If the FDA's jurisdiction over human reproductive cloning under
its existing authorizing statutes were upheld, or if Congress expressly
gave the FDA that authority, the need for California to act would be
diminished. It might not, however, disappear.[46] The FDA would
regulate human reproductive cloning with respect to safety. If
California believed that even safe reproductive cloning should be
banned, it might want to enact restrictive legislation since the FDA in
such a scenario, would legally have to allow reproductive cloning if
proven safe.
If the Congress bans human non-reproductive cloning, California
would not be able to permit that procedure. If Congress merely
regulates such cloning, California might be able to add further
regulatory requirements, depending on whether the federal statute
preempted state law. It might be, of course, that such federal
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regulation would cover all the issues of concern to the State, in which
case California legislation might be unnecessary.
B. Issues of Definition and Administration
All regulation of human cloning requires a definition of the
procedure to be regulated. Existing statutes and proposed legislation
have used differing, and in ways inadequate, definitions of human
cloning. Some have even argued that the definition in the existing
California statute, the best of those in current use, is ambiguous.
Advocates for assisted reproduction have argued that it prohibits the
transplantation of the nucleus of a human oocyte that would later be
fertilized by sperm, thus giving rise to an embryo with the
conventional two parents. It can be argued that the definition does
not include this procedure. In any event, as the sanctions in the
existing statute are imposed almost exclusively by the State
Department of Health Services, concerned researchers or assisted
reproduction clinicians could have, but did not, seek an interpretation
of the language from that Department. In spite of the weaknesses of
their arguments, they illustrate the challenges of clear definition.
There are two main problems in defining human cloning. First,
legislatures often lack the scientific expertise needed to write an
accurate definition. A number of bills introduced in American states
used definitions that were scientifically inaccurate or meaningless.
Second, the technology may change more rapidly than the definition.
For example, 1990 British legislation banned "human cloning" but
defined it in a way that did not include the Dolly procedure. As
another example, existing definitions, including California's, talk
about the transplantation of a donor cell's nucleus into a human
oocyte. It might be possible, however, to clone a human through
transplantation of a nucleus into a human embryonic cell or even a
non-human oocyte. Neither would be covered by existing legislation.
Instead of seeking to write an exact definition into the statute,
the Legislature should write a broad definition and invest a state
agency with the duty of writing, and, when necessary, revising,
specific definitions. For example, a legislative definition might read
as follows:
Human reproductive cloning is defined as the creation of a human
fetus that is substantially genetically identical to a previously-born
human being. The use in humans of somatic cell nuclear transfer
with a donor cell from an adult, as used in [47] the creation of
Dolly, is an example of such cloning. The Department of Health
Services shall have the power to write and interpret regulations
defining more precisely the procedures that consist human
reproductive cloning for the purposes of this statute.
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With this kind of a definition the administrative agency could
have, or acquire, scientific advice on a proper definition. It could also
change or interpret the definition to keep pace with changing
technology much more rapidly and easily than the Legislature.
C. Confronting New Issues Arising from Biotechnology
The Committee was given a relatively narrow mandate - to
make recommendations about state policy on human cloning. Even
that mandate, however, led to some difficult new issues. The most
troublesome for the Committee was "cloning" by embryo-splitting
(also known as "blastomere-separation").
Embryos can split at an early stage to produce two (or, rarely,
more) people who are genetically identical. This is the source of
human identical twins, who make up about one birth in every 240.
Although there has been very little research into artificial embryo-
splitting in humans, there seems to be no substantial barrier to
splitting embryos that are created through in vitro fertilization. In
essence, this process would create additional identical twins. In the
normal course of events, none of the twins would be identical to
anyone who had been alive before; each would have a copy of a new
genome. This mitigates substantially many of the arguments against
human reproductive cloning.
Embryo splitting is not addressed by the existing California
legislation on cloning, nor did the Committee believe that it was
clearly within our mandate. Embryo splitting, however, can raise
issues similar to those arising from human reproductive cloning by
nuclear transfer and addressed above. The first important issues are
those of physical safety. A review of the results of research on this
process with other mammalian species would be important.
A second cluster of issues arises from the potential use of
embryo-splitting to have a "delayed" twin. One or more embryos
created by this splitting could be frozen for a period of time, later to
be removed from cryopreservation and implanted into a woman.
This might occur weeks or years after the first embryo is implanted
and brought to term. The latter twin would have a genotype that has
already come into existence. The parents (or others) could wait and
see whether they wanted another copy of the first child, producing
many of the concerns of nuclear transfer cloning.
On the other hand, this is only a concern if some of the split
embryos are frozen for a significant period of time. Embryo splitting
and implantations only a short time apart (e.g., months) would look
more like the case of naturally-occurring identical twins. Whether,
for example, 5 or 10 year birth separations are sufficient to trigger the
same kinds of psychological risks as reproductive cloning from a
mature adult requires a more [48] discriminating analysis. Similarly,
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the use of embryo-splitting to have a delayed twin as a source of
replacement tissue or nonessential organs for the first child also
implicates the commodification of children and abuse arguments
addressed above.
The Committee was not charged with making recommendations
on embryo-splitting, and thus did not solicit witnesses on the topic.
Nevertheless, in light of the overlapping issues and arguments, the
Committee believes further evaluation of these issues, by someone, is
appropriate. This appears to the Committee to be a perfect example
of the kinds of complicated issues that human biotechnology will raise
for state governments. Currently, the Legislature and the Governor
have few ways to get expert advice on such issues. This Committee is
an exception, not the rule.
We strongly recommend that California establish some kind of
mechanism to provide expert advice to the government on such
issues. Such a group would require some modest funding and staff. It
should, however, prove invaluable in helping the State come to grips
with the new dilemmas posed by rapid advances in our understanding
of human biology. Not only would this enable California to play its
historic role as a leading state "laboratory of democracy," in the
words of Justice Louis Brandeis, but, more importantly, it would
increase its ability to protect its citizens from dangerous or unwise
applications of our new scientific knowledge of human biology. [49]
SEPARATE STATEMENT OF FRANCIS C. PIZZULLI
I believe Recommendations Nos. 2 and 4 should go significantly
further. They should (1) suggest the scope of an enforcement agency,
particularly for non-federally funded entities that are not deterred by
IRB disapproval and consequent loss of federal funding; (2)
recommend directing the agency having jurisdiction over public and
private research to promulgate regulations for the approved IRBs: (a)
to identify possible risk/benefit criteria supplemental to federal IRB
regulations (which do not address human non-reproductive cloning),
especially as there is more than minimal risk to women donating eggs,
e.g., (i) the progress of work to derive stem cells from nuclear transfer
in primates and other species; (ii) the status of alternative approaches
to solving the immune response issue in cell replacement therapy
(e.g., via adult stem cells or histocompatibility reprogramming
techniques on embryonic stem cells); (iii) the criteria proposed by the
1994 NIH Human Embryo Research Panel (discussed above) (e.g.,
the information sought could not be obtained by other means and the
proponent demonstrates a compelling reason for the research of
outstanding scientific value); (iv) security controls; and (b) to
implement centralized oversight as appropriate, such as is found in
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NIH's Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) and Human
Pluripotent Stem Cell Review Group (both of which provide for some
public access). Reasonable regulation under the above criteria
neither mandates immediate approval nor precludes the possibility
that technological developments will obviate the demand for this
technique for cell replacement therapy.
The bipartisan approach to the public oversight of cloning - as
exemplified by the overwhelming passage of S.B. 1344 led by genetics
policy expert Patrick Johnston (D-Sacramento) and Jim Battin (R-La
Quinta)-teaches that what Leon Kass and Daniel Callahan refer to
as the opening act of a long debate over a genetics "revolution" need
not be based on traditional divides. As Lori Andrews points out,
both new and old analytical concepts and values may be invoked in
the debate, ranging from child abuse and incest laws, to genetic
bondage and constitutional antipathy to caste systems and titles of
nobility, as well as questions of who merits "merit" in a world of
genetic enhancements.
Public trust in an effective oversight system, state or federal, will
redound to the benefit of the regulated sector in addressing the
citizenry's fears of a brave new world being fabricated without its
informed consent.
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